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ABSTRACT 
"Sous les balles des troupes federales:" Representing the Quebec City Riots 
in Francophone Quebec (1919-2009) 
Chris Young 
This thesis examines the various representations of the 1918 Quebec City anti-
conscription riots over the course of the last hundred years in francophone Quebec. It 
argues that the riots had been largely ignored by Quebec's professional and amateur 
historical communities until the Quiet Revolution. As the social and intellectual forces 
changed in the 1960s, some of the amateurs, the most important being Jean Provencher, 
re-discovered the story of the riots. Provencher's Quebec: sous la hi des mesures de 
guerre 1918 and his subsequent play Quebec, Printemps 1918(1973) were written to 
honour the four victims who were deemed unfairly killed, as well as to commemorate 
those Quebecers who chose to fight for, what the author believed, was a worthy cause. 
Additionally, his work also meant to correct the perceived historical wrong of a tragic 
event that seemed to have been forgotten by Quebecers. Although he claimed his works 
were "objective", Provencher wrote this history with a political message and accordingly 
selected, interpreted, and manipulated documents in order to strengthen his argument. 
Since then, Quebec's francophone historians, mostly amateurs, have parroted 
Provencher's works contributing very little that is new on the topic. Consequently, 
although the story of the riots is widely represented today in Quebec, it continues to be 
told through a tragic and simplistic narrative of victimization. 
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Preface 
The idea for this project was loosely formulated on the Prairies, a few thousand 
kilometres west of Quebec. I was showing my grade eleven Canadian History class an 
episode from the CBC documentary Canada: A People's History which told the story of 
Canada's First World War conscription crisis and the 1918 Quebec City anti-conscription 
riots. The documentary's narrative of the riots, which ended with the Canadian army 
killing four Quebec civilians, was violent, bloody, tragic and sensational. Of course, as 
the documentarian would have known, these dramatic elements certainly made Canadian 
history profoundly more interesting for the students, and dare I say for the teacher as 
well. 
With my curiosity piqued, I visited the University of Winnipeg library in order to 
read more on the topic. It was here, for the first time, that I encountered Jean 
Provencher's important work Quebec: sous la loi des mesures de guerre 1918 (1971). 
The historian's story of the riots, much like Canada: A People's History, was one 
centered on the victimization of Quebecers at the hands of the Canadian army. After 
reading Provencher's captivating book, the only one entirely devoted to the subject, I was 
inspired to write my thesis about the Quebec City riots. Although, the project in the end 
evolved in many different ways, as all projects do, I decided to look at what happened 
during the riots based on an examination of the primary documents, as well as how the 
riots have been both forgotten and remembered mainly through the historiography, but 
also through other representations like documentaries and public commemoration. 
To complete this study, I have reviewed newspapers, archival documents, 
academic and amateur works, textbooks, documentaries, plays, internet sites, historical 
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plaques and the Quebec City riots monument. My research has taken me to Ottawa's 
Library and National Archives Canada, as well as to Quebec City's Bibliotheque et 
archives nationals du Quebec and to the Archives de la ville de Quebec. However, most 
of my time has been spent in Montreal combing the shelves of the Concordia and McGill 
Libraries, and above all those of the Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec. It was there, 
more than anywhere else, where I spent many an hour looking at works from 1919 to the 
present that might tell, in one form or another, the story of the Quebec City riots. 
This study derives almost exclusively from sources produced by Quebec 
Francophones, a group I will refer to throughout the study by the word "Quebecers." 
Although there have been some works written by Anglophones dealing with the Quebec 
City riots, in particular a chapter in Elizabeth Armstrong's The Crisis of Quebec 1914-
1918 (1937), one of the project's goals is to focus on the memory of the riots in Quebec's 
francophone historical community. It is this diverse group of professional historians, with 
PhDs, and amateurs with a wide range of credentials, that has played a role in influencing 
how Quebecers have remembered the riots. Although I am not in a position to discuss to 
what extent Quebecers in general have appropriated this community's works on the riots, 
I am able to analyze the content of these representations and to show that these works are 
a reflection of the society in which the various historians have lived. 
3 
Introduction 
At first sight, the three-road intersection in Quebec City's Saint-Sauveur 
neighborhood is as unassuming as any other. On one side there is a modest Vietnamese 
restaurant and a bicycle repair shop, on the other a small pub and a self-defence studio. 
The third side has a little park and a bus stop. Beside the bus stop, only a few feet from 
the busy road, there is a rather peculiar looking historical monument. It is approximately 
three and a half meters in height, with a narrow, rectangular, stone body with a metal 
stem through its middle. Above the body is a metal flower with petals of human form. 
The only inscription, on the monument's base, reads Quebec, Printemps 1918 (see figure 
1). While many might be perplexed by the oddity, its strange location, and its ambiguous 
name, there is an explanatory plaque nearby that describes the unusual history of this 
intersection. 
The commemorative intent of Quebec, Printemps 1918 is to remember the five-
day anti-conscription riots that occurred in the province's capital city during the First 
World War. More specifically, according to the plaque, it recalls April 1st, 1918, when 
Quebecers, defending their principles while armed only with rocks, were tragically 
machine gunned down by an Anglophone Canadian army at the corners of Rue Saint-
Joseph Ouest, Rue Bagot, and Rue Saint-Vallier. The plaque explains that the 
monument's flower form, with its human petals, represents both the spirit of spontaneous 
resistance as well as the fragility of human life as exemplified by the four Quebecers 
killed. 
In the summer of 2006,1 went to Quebec City to research the riots and to see the 
monument. After a long day in the archives, I jogged to the lower town through the Saint-
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Sauveur district to visit Quebec, Printemps 1918.1 noticed a down-trodden elderly man 
at the intersection, sitting on a bench by the bus stop, between the monument and the 
explanatory plaque. As I read the historical plaque, the man, in a thick accent, quietly 
said to me, "Vous savez monsieur, pour longtemps cette histoire a ete oublie." I looked at 
him with surprise and he repeated himself, "Oui, pour longtemps, les Quebecois ne se 
rappelaient pas de cette histoire des emeutes." He told me that he grew up in the area, 
mumbled a few more unintelligible words, and staggered away. I stood there, stunned, 
reflecting on this serendipitous moment. In his simplicity, he conveyed a sentiment 
articulated particularly by Jean Provencher, the sole historian to have written extensively 
on the subject, that the Quebec City riots had been forgotten by Quebecers but through 
commemoration this injustice was slowly being resolved. Caught in the shadow of its 
metal head, I looked up at the awkward-looking flower and thought, "How has this story 
been remembered?" 
Quebec, Printemps 1918 provides a memory of the First World War that is 
foreign to most Anglophone Canadians. In English Canada, there is no lack of memory 
regarding the devastating international conflict, but it is usually linked to Europe and the 
Western Front experience. Many remember the 66,000 Canadians who sacrificed their 
lives for four-and-a-half years on the soggy battlefields of Flanders and the Somme. 
Some imagine the conditions these young men encountered while trying to survive in 
shell-torn trenches infested with rats, lice, mud and death. Others picture the soldiers 
going "over the top," advancing through a No Man's Land plagued with barbed wire and 
scattered craters while dodging German bullets and artillery shells. Certain mythic 
images continue to inspire: Ypres, "In Flanders' Fields", Billy Bishop, the Last Hundred 
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Days, and of course, Vimy. The war's memory is immortalized in the cenotaphs, 
monuments, and museums found in towns and cities across the country. At the same 
time, its memory is also preserved in Canadian books, plays, film and music. 
Until very recently, my memory of the First World War was that of most 
Anglophone Canadians—that of the battlefront. In high school, my grade eleven 
Canadian history textbook, Challenge and Survival: The History of Canada1, detailed the 
soldiers' experience during the war. The Quebec City riots were not mentioned. At the 
University of Winnipeg, I completed a four year honours degree in Canadian history 
without learning the story of the riots, and only briefly studying the conscription crisis. 
One summer, I worked as a tour guide at Vimy Ridge in northern France, where nine 
other university students and I explained the story of the Canadian experience during the 
war. Encouraged by Veterans' Affairs Canada, our narrative for the history of Vimy, and 
the war in general, was centered on principles of duty, sacrifice, nationalism, and 
increased independence from Great Britain. We also mentioned that the only French 
Canadian battalion to fight at Vimy was the Royal 22nd or the "Vandoos," and usually 
remarked that the battle was not internalized by Quebecers as the nation-building 
experience felt by most of Canada. However, even if this led to a cursory discussion 
about conscription, we never spoke about the violence in Quebec City. When I was at 
Vimy, this story was simply not conveyed at Canada's most-visited overseas First World 
War memorial. 
When I first began researching the topic of memory and the First World War in 
francophone Quebec, I was astonished by the prevalence of the riots' story. Today, it is 
' H.H Herstein et al., Challenge & Survival: The History of Canada (Scarborough, Ont: Prentice Hall of 
Canada, 1970). 
everywhere. The story is found in textbooks, plays, radio broadcasts, documentaries and 
on the Internet. For someone who thought Vimy and the Last Hundred Days were the 
defining moments of the war experience, I was surprised to learn that many Quebecers' 
predominant memory is of the conscription crisis and its climactic moment, the Quebec 
City riots. Beatrice Richard, for one, writes, "Pour les Anglo-Canadiens, la bataille de 
Vimy constitue l'acte de naissance symbolique de la nation canadienne. Dans la memoire 
des Canadiens francais, c'est plutot la crise de conscription, avec l'emeute sanglante du 
dimanche de Paques 1918 qui constitue une episode unificateur."2 Currently, there are 
few francophone history textbooks that explain battlefront war stories. In some cases, the 
soldiers' overseas experience is replaced entirely by the conscription crisis and the riots. 
In such books the four killed are often mentioned and sometimes even profiled by name 
and occupation. On the other hand, the Royal 22nd battalion, and its 2,967 French 
Canadian soldiers killed overseas, receives scant attention; the soldiers' lives are almost 
never personalized. Students might learn about the anti-conscriptionist Armand Lavergne 
or Georges Demeule, the fourteen-year-old boy killed on April 1 st, but will rarely learn 
about Jean Brillant, one of two French Canadian soldiers to win the Victoria Cross for 
bravery. Ultimately, one must question why some stories are privileged over others. 
The complex dialectic of remembering and forgetting is fundamental to 
understanding memory. Pierre Nora explains that memory is in constant evolution, 
"unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and 
appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived."3 The French 
theorist argues that, over time, societies remember, re-remember and forget in order to 
2
 Beatrice Richard, 'La memoire collective de la guerre au Quebec : un espace de resistance politique', 
Canadian Issues/Themes canadiens, (2004): 2. 
3
 Pierre Nora, 'Between Memory and History: Les lieux de memoire,' Representations, 26 (1989): 8. 
serve their present identity needs.4 He gives the example of Jeanne D'Arc. Nora explains 
that in an effort to unify diverse groups such as the church and the peasantry, by the late 
19th century the French had reconstructed the heroine's symbol, making her the 
embodiment of French identity.5 Similarly, the Quebec City riots were for a long time 
forgotten, and then remembered, to satisfy the demands of the present. But one must 
question what these writers remembered and for what purpose. 
In many cases, the memory of an event can be at odds with what appears to have 
actually happened. For example, Joyce Appleby explains that during the 19' century, 
Americans remembered their Revolution as being the logical end of a colonial experience 
in which the thirteen colonies had wanted to unite in order to a establish a federal 
government that would protect their inherent rights. The historian points out that this 
was a "narrative of invention" in order to construct a self-identity for their young nation 
based on the 19th century ideal of democratic nationalism.7 She writes, "If the Declaration 
was made to appear as the natural end point of colonial developments, then the 
independence of the United States could be understood as the climax to a long and heroic 
sequence of events." Appleby argues that this memory contradicts historical evidence. 
She shows that the thirteen colonies had little in common, had no real interest in joining 
to form a country, and certainly would not have done so for the purpose of defending 
natural rights. Instead, she believes that Americans chose independence in an abrupt 
manner which marked an unexpected rupture from the colonial period.8 Nevertheless, 
4
 Ibid., 12. 
5
 Pierre Nora & David P.Jordan, eds. Rethinking France: Les lieux de memoire, Volume 1: The State 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), XXiX. 
6
 Joyce Appleby et al. Telling the Truth about History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 103. 
7
 Ibid., 104. 
8
 Ibid., 103. 
8 
Appleby demonstrates that in post-revolutionary America the events that likely inspired 
Americans to choose independence were much less important than a utilitarian memory 
that could suit subsequent generations. 
Similarly, in Quebec, memory has played an integral role in the formation of 
identity among most Quebecers. Like the American example, many Quebecers have 
developed a collective memory of their past that often better explains their views of the 
present than what might have occurred in history. With "Je me Souviens" as their 
provincial motto, most Quebecers feel that they have a duty to remember their past, a past 
perceived as being full of defeats and impediments.9 Historian Jocelyn Letourneau writes, 
"It seems there is one thing that is impossible for Quebecers to forget, and that is their 
having been the victims of the 'Other.'" The "Other" could be the enemy within, such as 
the Church, Maurice Duplessis, and Francophone federalists. It could also be the enemy 
outside its borders: the English, foreign capital, the federal government and periodically 
Americans. Even though many Quebec historians for the last thirty years have argued 
that there is nothing exceptional about their history—that Quebec developed in a normal 
pattern, similar to other North American societies—it seems that academia has not 
eradicated the average Quebecers' view of the past as one full of failures. Asked to 
summarize their view of Quebec history in a survey, Letourneau discovered that the 
majority of his university students saw themselves as being a "people that was for a long 
time backward, oppressed by the clergy and by the English, and that has succeeded in 
part in averting the terrible fate looming over it by re-founding itself through the Quiet 
9
 Jocelyn Letourneau, A History for the Future: Rewriting Memory and Identity in Quebec (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 8. 
10
 Ibid., 24. 
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Revolution, a great collective leap forward."11 The memory of the past that many 
Quebecers have developed is simple, tragic, and based on conflict with the "Other." 
There is perhaps no better example of this than the memory of the Quebec City riots. 
My thesis will show that the current memory of the riots in the historiography, as 
well as in other representations, is one centered on a narrative of victimization that was 
largely influenced by Jean Provencher's work Quebec: sous la hi des mesures de guerre 
1918 (1971). However, for the first forty years following the riots, the story had been 
mostly forgotten by Quebec's historical community both in professional and amateur 
circles. It was not until Quebec's Quiet Revolution and afterwards, that historians, 
influenced by the academic and social forces of their times, as was Jean Provencher, 
began to re-discover the story of the riots. 
This study is divided into four chapters. The first provides historical context by 
looking at francophone resistance to enlistment and conscription in Quebec during the 
First World War. The second chapter offers a new interpretation of the turbulent days in 
Quebec City between March 28 and April 2nd, 1918. Based predominantly on primary 
documents, it explores the motivations and actions of the main figures involved in the 
riots. The third chapter's introduction comments on how the riots were remembered in 
the historiography from 1919 to the publication of Provencher's book in 1971. The 
chapter's body is an analysis of his work Quebec: sous la loi des mesures de guerre 1918 
and his subsequent play Quebec, Printemps 1918 (1973). Chapter four looks at the 
memory of the riots from the mid-1970s to the present by examining various 
representations in the historiography, but also in documentaries and public 
commemoration. 
11
 Ibid., 21. 
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This study should prove valuable for two reasons. First, aside from Provencher's 
work, written almost forty years ago, no historian has dedicated serious time in the 
archives researching this story. The work should therefore interest its readers as it 
provides a new interpretation. Second, and more broadly, this is the first examination of 
how the Quebec City riots have been remembered over the last century. This is useful not 
only to understand how the present influences what we remember, but to also make one 
ponder what is remembered and what is forgotten in Quebec/Canadian history. Currently, 
this is a particularly salient issue in Quebec, demonstrated by the controversy regarding a 
new high school history curriculum titled "Histoire et education a la citoyennete." This 
curriculum was released to the public in the spring of 2006 and will be discussed further 
in my conclusion. 
In That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical 
Profession, Peter Novick writes that "those who think as I do are content, in our historical 
work, to be suggestive, and we don't worry about being definitive. We want to offer what 
we hope will be fruitful-perhaps even 'edifying'-new ways of looking at things in the 
past." I agree entirely. My intention in this work is to re-think a significant Canadian 
historical event, to raise questions about what took place in the spring of 1918 and to 
critique some of the assumptions that have been taken for granted in its remembrance. In 
no way do I claim to have the final word on the topic, nor do I believe that my 
interpretation is any more valid than those which came before me or those who will 
follow—it is just different. I suppose there will be some "truth" to be found in my work, 
but it will be partial and contingent on the way I have interpreted my research. In the end, 
12
 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The Objectivity Question and the American Historical Profession 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 702. 
11 
despite the acknowledged limitations that comes with all historical writing, I hope this 
study will both offer a nuanced interpretation of one of the most violent riots in Canadian 
history, as well as serve as a useful analysis of how and why this event has been both 
forgotten and remembered. 
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1 
Enrolez-vous? War, Quebec and Conscription 
It only takes a few bullets to spark an international crisis. On June 28th 1914, 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, was 
murdered in Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip, a young member of the Black Hand terrorist 
group. Hoping to free all the Serbs and Croats from the grips of the Hapsburg Empire, 
Princip believed the Archduke's murder would bring attention to his group's cause. He 
received attention. Within a few weeks, due in large part to secret alliances and other 
indirect causes, this seemingly minor incident erupted into the First World War. In early 
August, Great Britain and its empire, including the Dominion of Canada, declared war on 
Germany. 
At the beginning of the war most Canadians believed in the justness of the cause. 
Quebec was no exception. In both cities and countryside, crowds gathered to show 
support for Great Britain, France and their allies. In Montreal, people sang outside 
newspaper offices and paraded through the streets, simultaneously shouting "Vive le 
Roi" and "Vive la France."13 Montreal's La Presse newspaper wrote "Un souffle guerrier 
agite I'Union Jack et le Tricolore, dont les couleurs se marient fierement au-dessus de 
leurs tetes. C'est la marche en avant pour le salut de la Patrie et L'Empire."14 In Quebec 
City, British-born Canadians, Irish-born Canadians, and French-Canadians, three groups 
that historically had not always seen eye-to-eye, assembled to show their common 
13 
Elizabeth Armstrong, The Crisis of Quebec 1914-1918 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), 
56. 
14
 La Presse, 3 August 1914. 
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disapproval of the Germans.15 Even the ardent Quebec nationalist, Henri Bourassa, editor 
of the newspaper Le Devoir, supported the war in the early days of August 1914.16 
However, the war euphoria could not last. This was most noticeable in Quebec. 
By the fall of 1914, it was apparent that Quebecers' enlistment numbers in the 
Canadian army were proportionally lower than in the rest of Canada, for many reasons. 
At the turn of the century, when Canada decided to support the British Empire in its 
conflict against the Boers in South Africa many French Canadians questioned the 
relevance of such an imperialist adventure. In 1910, when the Federal government passed 
its Naval Service Bill that allowed the British to use its ships during wartime, the anti-
imperial sentiment among French Canadians grew stronger. Furthermore, Quebecers did 
not feel comfortable in a Canadian military controlled by Anglophones. Before the war, 
all instruction at the Royal Military College in Kingston had been in English; 
1 7 
consequently, few of the high-ranking officers spoke French. In 1912, only 27 of 254 
officers were French Canadians. Moreover, in pre-1914 Canada, there were no French 
Canadian battalions or regiments because British-born officers saw it as a low priority. 
When the war began, all training was in English and enlisted Francophones often 
experienced discrimination. The worst of it came from the Minister of the Militia, 
Colonel Sam Hughes, an Orangeman from Ontario, who publicly revealed his disdain for 
French Canadian soldiers.1 He placed Anglophone officers in control of the recruiting 
system, making it difficult for French Canadians to be promoted and he dissolved French 
Armstrong, 56. 
16
 Sandra Gwyn, Tapestry of War: A private view of Canadians during the Great War (Toronto: 
HarperCollins, 1992), 316. 
17
 Susan Mann Trofimenkoff, The Dream of Nation: A Social and Intellectual History of Quebec (Toronto: 
Gage Publishing Limited, 1983), 208. 
18
 Sandra Gwyn, Tapestry of War, 316. 
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Canadian units to reinforce English battalions. Hughes was also criticized for not 
allowing the highest ranking French speaking soldier, General Louis Lessard, to 
command an overseas division.19 
There were also social explanations for low enlistments among Quebecers. They 
were generally more rural and often married younger than their Anglo-Canadian 
counterparts. As might be expected, there were also fewer British-born men in Quebec, 
the group most likely to enlist in other provinces particularly in Ontario. In fact, 70 per 
cent of the First Division that went overseas were Canadians born in Great Britain. 
Similarly, Canadians from families that had been living in Canada for numerous 
generations were less likely to enlist, and French-speaking Quebec families were the 
oldest in Canada. It appears that many Quebecers supported France and its fight against 
the Germans, but they felt little attachment to a country that was perceived by many as 
having abandoned them after the Plains of Abraham. Still, perhaps it was a domestic 
issue that most significantly curtailed enlistment in Quebec. 
Both before and during the war, the Ontario schools' crisis was a thorn in the side 
of most French-speaking Canadians. In 1912, the provincial government, in Regulation 
XVII, restricted French instruction to the first two years of elementary school and 
demanded that all subsequent schooling be in English, excluding only one hour a day of 
French.21 The government argued that the bilingual system was expensive and produced 
poor students. Many Franco-Ontarians and Quebecers were enraged. Some saw this 
19
 Patrice A Dutil, "Against Isolationism," In Canada and the First World War, edited by David Mackenzie 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 117. 
20
 Desmond Morton, "La Guerre d'independance du Canada une perspective Anglophone," in La premiere 
guerre mondiale et le Canada eds. Legault & Lamarre (Montreal: Meridien, 1999), 24. 
Yvan Lamonde, Histoire sociale des idees au Quebec (Saint-Laurent: Fides, 2000-2004), 60. 
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directive as another Anglophone Canadian ploy to assimilate the French. For three years, 
French Canadians lobbied against the directive, to no avail. In 1915, to much outcry, 
Regulation XVII became law. Bourassa, who advocated a bilingual and bicultural 
Canada, used his newspaper to virulently criticize the Ontario government, and attacked 
the federal government for not using its power of disallowance to stop the bill from 
becoming law. Many Quebecers began to wonder where the real war was being waged. 
In front of the Quebec provincial legislature, Armand Lavergne, a well-known lawyer 
and Bourassa's right-hand man, proclaimed: 
Si nous devons conquerir nos libertes, c'est ici que nous devons rester. Ce n'est 
pas dans les tranchees des Flandres que nous irons conquerir le droit de parler 
francais en Ontario....Je dirai que chaque sou depense dans le Quebec pour aider 
a l'enrolement des hommes, est de 1'argent vole a la minorite de 1'Ontario... Je me 
demande si le regime allemand ne pourrait pas etre favorablement compare a celui 
des Boches de l'Ontario.22 
Undoubtedly, the Nationalists' goal to focus attention on the plight of the Franco-
Ontarian minority significantly hurt recruiting efforts in French Quebec. 
Despite obstacles and inhibitions, Quebecers still enlisted in the Canadian Army. 
By the end of the war, approximately 15,000 Quebecers had served voluntarily.24 Many 
who enlisted had been encouraged by prominent Quebecers who publicly supported the 
war. Wilfrid Laurier told potential recruits, "If I were young enough myself, I too, would 
9S 
be in the firing line." On August 8, 1914, Montreal's Archbishop Bruschesi told his 
congregation, "C'est notre devoir a tous de dormer a l'Angleterre notre loyal et genereux 
Mason Wade, Les canadiens francais, de 1760 a nos jours, translated by Adrien Venne (Ottawa: Cercle 
du Livre de France, 1963), 92. 
23
 Patrice A. Dutil, 114. 
24
 Trokimenkoff, 26. 
25
 Granatstein & Hitsmen, 32. 
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appui. Notre peuple n'y manquera pas."26 Perhaps no one was more important than 
Doctor Arthur Mignault, who financed a French Canadian battalion. Mignault and 
Frederic Monderet Gaudet, the first lieutenant colonel of the Royal 22nd battalion, 
relentlessly recruited young Quebecers for overseas action by appealing to their sense of 
history. In an enthusiastic speech at a large recruiting rally in Montreal's Pare Sohmer, 
Monderet said, "Messieurs, vous etes les fils de LaSalle, de Dollard des Ormeaux et de 
Frontenac. Vous avez herite des qualites de vos ancetres: enrolez-vous avec les votres 
dans le regiment canadien-francais." 7 
Quebec's French-language press, like many of its French-speaking leaders, 
mostly supported the soldiers' efforts during the war. Although Le Devoir focused 
mainly on the conflict between Anglophones and Francophones, manifested by the 
Ontario schools' crisis, other newspapers, like La Patrie, Quebec City's Le Soleil, and the 
church-directed Action Catholique allocated more space to support the troops and the 
war effort (though without ignoring the Ontario dilemma). It was La Presse, Canada's 
most-read daily at the time, that worked the hardest to increase reader enlistment and 
celebrate the heroism of the troops overseas. From the beginning to the end of the war, 
La Presse informed the public about the Royal 22nd, its changes of leadership, its 
movements on the battlefield, its injured, and of course, its dead. In addition, the 
newspaper profiled many of its soldiers, such as the highly-decorated Georges Vanier, 
who later became the first French-Canadian Governor General, as well as Joseph Keable 
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and Jean Brillant, the only two Quebecers to receive the Victoria Cross. It appears that 
most French language newspapers, as well as many Quebecers, admired the courage of 
the soldiers and believed that their cause was just. Still, despite sympathy for the 
soldiers' plight, most Quebecers remained opposed to conscription. 
In August 1914, when Canada entered the war, there was no need for the 
government to conscript its young men. Potential recruits were turned away by some 
militia regiments. Toronto's Queen's Own Rifles, for example, only allowed those who 
had previously served in the battalion to enlist. At the Toronto headquarters of the 48th 
Highlanders "recruiting officers sifted through the flock, taking only the best physical 
specimens into the building for examination. Hundreds were turned away." By October, 
the First Division and its 31,000 volunteers had sailed overseas to train for battle. In 
December, Robert Borden, the Conservative prime minister of Canada, told a Halifax 
crowd that "there has not been, there will not be, compulsion or conscription." Still, by 
the following summer, fueled by Bourassa's rhetoric, Quebecers worried about the 
introduction of conscription. On July 23rd, at Montreal's Pare Lafontaine, a minor riot 
broke out at a recruiting rally for the 41st battalion. The crowd, estimated by Le Devoir to 
number 12,000 people, and 1,500 by the Montreal Gazette, tore down recruiting posters 
and screamed "non a la conscription." All of Quebec's English-language newspapers, 
and most French, condemned the riots. 
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In a New Year's address to Canadians, at the beginning of 1916, Borden promised 
to double the size of the army from 250,000 men to half a million.34 Laurier, as leader of 
the Opposition, called Borden's promise a "large contract." Nevertheless, for the first six 
months of 1916, recruiting numbers were stable. By July, the army had about 312,000 
officers and men. However, it was becoming obvious that many young men were 
enlisting because of social pressure. For example, Rev.Logan Geggie told a crowd of 
people in Toronto that "any young man free of family ties who shirks his duty should be 
branded a coward."35 In Hamilton, the municipal government let go of all of its part-time 
construction workers so that they could enlist. Despite these pressures, the numbers of 
volunteers began to dwindle by the fall of 1916. This reality, for an army that badly 
needed replacements after devastating battles at Mont Sorrel and Courcelette, forced the 
Canadian government to consider other means to raise troops. 
Borden's decision to introduce conscription was based on several factors. After 
his trip to Europe in early 1917, the prime minister became acutely aware that Canada 
and its Allies were having serious problems in their fight to win the war. In February, 
Russia's government was overthrown by revolutionaries upset by the price of bread and 
the government's mishandling of the war. In April, the French army engaged in yet 
another disastrous offensive which provoked widespread mutinies among the ranks.36 
The British also had problems. Almost every day, the German navy waged an 
increasingly successful submarine campaign against British ships, sinking thousands of 
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tons of desperately-needed supplies to provision England and its Allies. Some good news 
came when the Americans, with their vast supplies of men and resources, decided to join 
the war, but it would take time before the Americans were ready to fight, and the Allies 
were in desperate need of men. With the failure of the voluntary enlistment system, and 
with mounting battlefield losses, Borden believed the only way to fulfill his promise was 
to raise an army of 500,000 men through conscription. His resolve to implement 
conscription was further fastened after he met with the troops on the battlefield. In a letter 
to Montreal's Archbishop Bruchesi, Borden wrote, "I had the privilege of looking into 
the eyes of tens of thousands of men at the front who look to us for the effort which will 
make their sacrifice serve the great purpose for which it was undertaken." It appears 
that one purpose, in the prime minister's mind, was greater independence and 
international clout after the war for Canada. Determined not to fail the Allies or his 
troops, the prime minister felt conscription was the only answer, even if it meant sparking 
a domestic crisis. 
In May 1917, riots broke out in Montreal after Borden told Parliament he planned 
to introduce a conscription bill. On May 23rd, 3,000 people met at Montreal's Champs de 
Mars and broke the windows of the pro-conscription newspaper La Patrie. Meanwhile, at 
Pare Lafontaine, 10,000 people gathered to denounce the bill and the following night, 
crowds estimated at approximately 15,000 broke a streetcar's windows, attacked a 
TO 
policeman, and threw rocks at the La Presse building. At the request of local authorities 
the military arrived and established order, although three soldiers were sent to the 
hospital by the mob. In June, the same month that the Catholic newspaper La Croix 
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contemplated the possibility of Quebec's secession from Canada, crowds in Montreal, 
Quebec City and other communities across the province gathered each night to protest 
conscription.39 One of the more vocal protesters, Armand Lavergne, threatened to 
organize an armed rebellion if the government refused to conduct a nation-wide 
referendum on conscription. At the end of the summer, violence broke out in Montreal 
once again after the Military Service Act—that is, conscription—became law. Mobs 
broke windows, raided gun shops for weapons, threw projectiles and shot guns, injuring a 
rioter and a policeman.40 In its description of these events, Montreal's Gazette wrote, 
"Crowds numbering two and three thousand marched through the Montreal streets, 
breaking windows, shouting 'Down with Borden' and 'Long Live the Revolution.'" 
There was even a plot, by the well-known anti-conscriptionist Elie Lalumiere, to blow up 
the residence of Lord Althostane, an Anglo-Canadian magnate. Many Quebecers were 
angry, and some Canadians knew exactly whom to blame for the violence.42 
Henri Bourassa and the Nationalists refused to take any responsibility for the 
rioting. In an August, 1917 Le Devoir article titled "Sterile Violence," Bourassa argued 
that his newspaper had always denounced violence. He wrote that those who led the 
rioting were attracting negative attention for Quebecers, giving more reasons for 
Anglophone Canadians to punish Quebec.43 Indeed, the majority of the French language 
newspapers, horrified by the violence in Montreal, admitted that the conscription law was 
deplorable, but asked their readers to remain calm and to obey it. Bourassa argued that 
Quebecers should work tirelessly to ensure that all anti-conscription candidates were 
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elected in the next federal election. Others, like Oscar Drouin, an avid anti-conscriptionist 
encouraged resistance to the law and suggested that those affected by the Military Service 
Bill should organize themselves. In early September, Drouin, at an anti-conscription rally 
on Quebec City's Place Jacques Cartier, told the crowd he would assist anti-conscription 
groups in effective resistance to the law. 
In the summer of 1917, Robert Borden had to call a federal election. His 
government was extremely unpopular, accused of wartime patronage profiteering and of 
financing Canada's most infamous weapon, the Ross Rifle. Living costs were rising and 
consumer goods' prices were sky rocketing. Knowing the election would be fought over 
the controversial issue of conscription, the Conservative government used shrewd 
strategies to secure a win. In mid-August, it passed the War Time Voters' Act, giving 
overseas troops the right to vote—thus securing their electoral support. In early 
September, it passed the War Time Elections' Act, allowing women over the age of 21 to 
vote, as long as they had a brother, son, husband, or father in the military. The Elections' 
Act also disenfranchised Canadian citizens born in enemy countries, who had arrived in 
Canada after 1902; in addition it took the vote away from conscientious objectors, such 
as Mennonites and Doukhobors.46 The government feared these groups would support the 
Liberals' anti-conscription platform. In October, a few English-speaking western 
Liberals, who supported conscription, left Laurier and crossed Parliament's floor to form 
a coalition government. By October 12th a coalition cabinet comprising of 13 
Conservatives and ten Liberals was formed. Although the prime minister asked 
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Canadians to vote for his coalition government during the campaign, many Quebecers 
could not identify with a federal cabinet that had only two Quebecers. 
The prime minister seemed to care little about his government's lack of popularity 
in Quebec. It is likely Borden believed that if he could gain support from his core base— 
middle- to upper-class Anglo-Saxon Protestants—the Quebecer vote would be irrelevant. 
By the end of November, when Borden discovered that over 90 per cent of potential 
conscripts demanded exemptions—in both Ontario and Quebec—he criticized Quebecers 
for low enlistment in the Canadian army. It appears Borden did this to deflect attention 
from the embarrassing reality that most English-speaking Canadians who were being 
recruited were as unenthusiastic about joining the military as the French.47 
The press and other politicians soon joined the attacks. On December 3rd, the 
Toronto Mail and Empire questioned if Laurier wanted a German peace. A week later, 
the same newspaper wrote that the French-Canadian leader was surely supported by the 
Kaiser.48A Unionist Liberal in Winnipeg called Quebec "the plague-spot of the whole 
Dominion."49 On the day of the election, the Mail and Empire told its readers that a vote 
for the Liberals was a vote for Bourassa and the Nationalist movement. Most 
Quebecers, appalled by these attacks, denounced the Borden government and threw their 
support behind Laurier's Liberals. Although Quebecers were the largest group, others in 
the country also supported the Liberal leader and his anti-conscription position. 
Jack Granatstein, "Conscription in the Great War," in Canada and the First World War: Essays in 
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Organized labour was one such group which opposed conscription. In the spring 
and summer of 1917, organized workers protested on the streets and demanded that the 
government hold a referendum on the issue. On June 3rd, an anti-conscription protest in 
Winnipeg turned violent when the labour deputy, Fred Dixon, was seriously injured by 
soldiers who had recently returned from the Front.51 That same day, in Toronto, the 
military broke up a similar rally. In September 1917, at the 23rd Canadian Trades and 
Labour Congress, workers voted 200 to 6 in opposition of conscription but were less 
certain about how to oppose it. Many believed, like Bourassa, that the most effective 
strategy was to obey the law and use the electoral system to elect anti-conscriptionist 
parliamentarians; others felt that resistance and violence would be more successful. In a 
relatively close vote, 136 delegates voted to obey the law, and 106 to resist. Most of the 
resisters came from Quebec and the western provinces. At the Congress, there was even 
some talk about starting a massive general strike across the country to paralyze the 
economy and force the government to repeal the law. Despite their protests, Borden did 
not pay attention to the workers. Organized labour comprised only two per cent of the 
labour force—a constituency Borden felt he could ignore. 
On the other hand, the prime minister knew his dealings with farmers—another 
large group opposed to conscription—would require delicacy. Farmers worried about 
their harvests: if the government conscripted their sons for military service, harvesting 
would be impossible. Farmers also felt that the Allies should send more food, not troops. 
Knowing he could not alienate the farmers, in early December the prime minister passed 
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an Order in Council exempting all farmers' sons from conscription. Thus, on December 
17, farmers voted overwhelmingly in support of the Union government. 
Borden's Union government won the December election with an impressive 
majority. The Union government elected 153 members; the Liberals, 82. However, 
Quebecers held 62 of the Liberal seats. In the rest of Canada, Borden's party won all 
but 20 of the seats . After an overwhelmingly racist election campaign, the country was 
politically split by region and language. By and large, English-speaking Canadians sat on 
one side of the House of Commons; French-speaking Canadians on the other. 
The Union government's election win was devastating in Quebec. Some French-
speaking politicians questioned whether their understanding of Confederation—that of an 
equal pact between French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians—was working. 
Joseph Francoeur, a member of the Quebec provincial legislature, shocked Quebec and 
the rest of Canada when he proposed a motion passively suggesting that Quebec might 
secede from Canada. He said independence was an option if the other provinces 
understood Quebec as "un obstacle a 1'union, au progresse et au developpement du 
Canada."55 On January 17, 1918, the legislature had a lively debate when several 
Quebecers, particularly Quebec's Premier Lomer Gouin, defended Canada and 
Confederation. The resolution was withdrawn without a vote. While it seems Quebecers 
did not seriously intend to separate, the motion demonstrated their feelings of isolation, 
powerlessness and resentment. Thus, the Canadian government would need to act with 
caution in its conscription of Quebecers. 




Many Quebecers decided they would resist conscription at all costs. Some armed 
draft resisters hid in the backwoods of the Laurentian mountains. Others lied about being 
married or having children, while still others joined the priesthood. It was difficult for the 
military to find many of the draft dodgers because some local police forces did not co-
operate. In a letter to the Militia Council, General Joseph Landry, the officer-in-command 
of Quebec City, complained about the stubborn nature of the municipal and provincial 
police.56 Such a lack of enthusiasm might explain why so few men reported for duty in 
the capital city. According to a Military Service Act report issued by the government on 
April 1, 1918, Quebec City had the fewest men report for training compared to other 
Canadian cities. While other cities had on average approximately 1,500 men report, 
Quebec City had 225. Five thousand young men presented themselves for duty in 
Toronto, 2,206 in Winnipeg, 2,000 in Kingston and 1,417 in Montreal. Moreover, the 
report revealed that authorities stopped only 158 draft dodgers in Quebec City. Only 
Saint-John, New Brunswick, where 1,109 men reported for duty, had apprehended fewer 
resisters than Quebec City. 
With little help from local police forces, the search for draft resisters in Quebec 
became the responsibility of the federally-run Dominion Police Force, which was Eastern 
Canada's equivalent of the Royal North West Mounted Police. Many Quebecers 
criticized this force for being a band of heavy-handed misfits who enjoyed using violence 
in their search for draft resisters. Rumors circulated that some of the men who comprised 
the police force were criminals, released to catch draft dodgers. Similarly, stories 
circulated about a police force that ripped up exemption papers and arrested innocent 
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Quebecers.59 Particularly in the big cities, Quebecers said they recognized many of the 
policemen as the most disreputable characters in the province.60 As a result, there was 
enormous strain between these authorities and the population. This uncomfortable tension 
continued after an alleged draft-dodger was arrested in Quebec City, sparking one of the 
most violent riots in Canadian history. 
Le Devoir, 1 April 1918. 
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2 
The Quebec City Riots 1918 
Published in the early 1970s, Jean Provencher's book Quebec: sous la hi des 
mesures de guerre 1918 was the first to extensively examine the story of the Quebec City 
riots. In compiling his work, the young historian worked in various archives examining 
newspapers, government documents, and perhaps most importantly the almost 500 page 
coroner's inquest. Although a few writers had previously alluded to the riots in a chapter 
or in a few lines in a textbook, Provencher's work greatly contributed to the 
historiography of the riots as it was the first book on the subject that relied extensively on 
primary documents. Since its publication, the book has generally been well received by 
academics as well as the general public. In the preface, Fernand Dumont, a well-known 
and respected Quebec sociologist, lent the book credibility by explaining that it was 
written "avec la plus stricte objectivite."61 Laval's Fernand Harvey described 
Provencher's use of sources as being "abondantes et variees" and commented on how the 
historian "evite le parti-pris simpliste et conserve une distance necessaire face aux 
evenements."62 Years later, UQAM's Robert Comeau described Provencher's book as 
"un ouvrage prenant, remarquablement ecrit et documente."63 Furthermore, over the 
course of the last thirty-five years, Provencher has been asked to speak about the riots in 
newspapers, radio and television interviews. His work has been used in institutions like 
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Montreal's McCord museum 4, in Canadian history textbooks, and has been cited 
frequently on the internet. Academics, like Desmond Morton and Judy Torrance, popular 
writers like Normand Lester, and documentarians like Mark Starowitz have all used 
Provencher's book in their own work. 
Quebec sous la loi des mesures de guerre 1918 is powerful history. The book is 
well-written, simple, political, full of good and bad characters, and sensational. For 
Provencher, the Quebecers of 1918 were victims of the "Outsiders." He blames the 
Dominion Police, the federal government, and the army, for inspiring the rioting and 
provoking the violence on the Easter Monday which left four civilians dead. In addition, 
he also demonizes the enemy "within", Francophones like General Lessard, Brigadier 
General Landry and Alleyn Taschereau, the Minister of Justice's representative, for 
selling out to the English and betraying their own. Conversely, according to Provencher, 
the anti-conscriptionist leader Armand Lavergne, Police Chief Emile Trudel, Mayor 
Lavigueur and especially the rioters should all be admired for their willingness to stand 
up for a just cause. In the end, Provencher's book, which was dedicated to the four who 
were killed by the Canadian army, was written to commemorate the Quebecers of 1918 
as well as to correct the historical injustice of an event perceived as having been 
forgotten. 
Like all writers, when creating Quebec sous la loi des mesures de guerre 1918, 
Jean Provencher was influenced by the intellectual and social climate of his time. His 
book, published one year after the October Crisis, makes implicit connections between 
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the events of October 1970 and the spring of 1918. In addition, the writer's political 
narrative that depicts Quebecers as being victimized by the "Other" appears to have been 
inspired by the academics at the Universite de Montreal in the 1950s and 60s. 5 Like 
historians before and since, Provencher was searching for the elusive "truth" in the past 
and claimed to be "objective" in his pursuit. Nonetheless, he, like his contemporaries, 
could not help writing history with a political message and accordingly interpreted and 
selected documents that conformed to the politics of the present. 
This chapter is necessary because it provides context for understanding the riots. 
It is also important for the historiography on the subject because it is the first 
comprehensive academic study of the riots in forty years, as well as being the first work 
written in English on the topic in more than seventy. Like Provencher's work, this study 
has been shaped by forces of its own day, both within the historical discipline and by 
contemporary society. Consequently, although he and I have both used largely the same 
primary sources, particularly the two volume coroner's inquest, we offer two widely 
divergent narratives of the riots. 
I EASTER THURSDAY 1918 
On Thursday, March 28, 1918, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Joseph Mercier and 
his friend Alfred Deslauriers walked into the Salle Frontenac, a pool room and bowling 
hall in Quebec City's Saint-Roch neighborhood. Within minutes of entering, the two 
realized that a man named Belanger, one of the hated Dominion police officers, was in 
the hall. In a speech given after the riots, Laurier described Belanger as being "as well 
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known in the city of Quebec as Barabbas at Jerusalem. He is known to be a boxer, a 
pugilist, a bully and a disturber of the peace, always fond of showing off his muscles." 
Though both young men had been exempted from military service, Mercier and 
Deslauriers thought that it was best to leave the hall in order to avoid an encounter with 
Belanger. Mercier said he heard rumors that Dominon police agents, hoping to receive a 
$10 bonus, would shred exemption papers and arrest innocent Quebecers. While 
leaving, Dominion police agents stopped the two and asked to see their exemption 
papers. Deslauriers showed the agents his documents and was allowed to leave. However, 
Mercier had forgotten his exemption papers at home. Although the Dominion police 
agents did not allow him to call his home from the hall's public phone, he asked a friend 
to find his father to bring the papers. Meanwhile, the Dominion agents handed the young 
Quebecer to military authorities, who brought him to the station. Mercier said that the 
soldiers were heavy-handed, such that they held him on each side of his body so he could 
not move.69 Both municipal and Dominion police officers followed Mercier and the 
military police car. As the vehicles were leaving the Salle Frontenac, crowds of people 
protested Mercier's arrest and followed the cars, shouting "Lachez-le!Liberons-le!" 
Soon after Mercier and the authorities arrived at the nearby station, Mercier's father 
appeared with the son's exemption papers his son had been issued the previous 
November. Mercier went free.7 
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By this time, a crowd of approximately 5,000 people, both rioters and curious 
onlookers, had assembled outside of Saint-Roch's police station Number Three. With 
Easter weekend approaching, there were more Quebecers on the streets because their 
church services had ended. Some in the crowd became violent, throwing projectiles— 
mainly stones, bricks and pieces of ice—at the police station, breaking several windows. 
Much of the crowd's anger was directed towards Belanger, a well-known former athlete 
and restaurant owner, who had taken refuge with a few other agents in the station. 
Capitaine Charles Desrochers, head of the Dominion police force in Quebec City, and 
Emile Trudel, head of the City police, arrived at the station shortly after they received 
word of the crowd gathering. Desrochers went straight into the station while Trudel and 
several other officers remained outside, trying to calm the people. Trudel entered the 
station and noticed that Desrochers was on the phone with Brigadier General Joseph 
Landry. Desrochers was hoping Landry, in charge of Military District No.5 (Quebec City 
and its surrounding area), would bring the troops to the station. However, Landry replied 
that before the military could be used the city's mayor, Henri-Edgar Lavigueur, needed to 
provide written authorization signed by two Justices of the Peace. Trudel interrupted 
their conversation, saying that they could not leave the station for this request while it 
was under siege. 
After Landry spoke to Desrochers, he phoned the Mayor to inform him about the 
rioting. Lavigueur told the Brigadier General to make sure that the soldiers were ready in 
case they were needed. However, the Mayor hoped to peacefully resolve the problem 
by appealing to the crowd. Shortly after the phone call, Lavigueur arrived by car at Place 
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Jacques-Cartier, a public square where most of the crowd had congregated, a few feet 
from the police station. The Mayor asked the people to remain calm and to refrain from 
violence. He told them he was not aware of the incident that had provoked the rioting but 
that as soon as he was informed he would publicly address the issue. At the inquest, the 
Mayor said after he spoke, "les gens ont arrete; tout a cesse dans le temps."74 The Mayor 
told the crowd the Dominion police officers were no longer in the station, so there was no 
reason for the crowd to remain in the streets. After asking people to disperse, the Mayor 
returned home. 
According to Emile Trudel, the crowd became more agitated after the Mayor left 
and his police force was overwhelmed by rioters. He explained that once the crowd 
realized the Dominon police officers had escaped from the station through the basement, 
the crowd divided itself in two and searched for them. The mob quickly found the person 
they were looking for. Belanger was fleeing on a streetcar when a crowd of rioters 
assaulted him. They threw projectiles and punched the Dominion police officer several 
times in the face. Trudel said he heard a man scream from the street, "On a accroche 
Belanger dans les chars et puis on l'a a moitie tue."75 Another overzealous rioter yelled 
out from a crowd of approximately 1,000, "S'il est blesse, on va le rachever." Trudel, a 
local priest, and M. Letourneau, a Member of Parliament, all passionately asked the 
rioters to cease their violence. Trudel said, "Dans tout pays civilise on respecte 
l'ambulance; respectez au moins les blesses." The crowd listened and an ambulance 
took Belanger to the hospital. Although rumors spread that he had been killed, the 
hospital released him the following day. That same night the mob assaulted two other 
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Dominion police officers, Plamandon and Major Evanturel. In both cases, the mob 
forced the two men to promise to stop arresting conscripts.77 
II GOOD FRIDAY 1918 
On the morning of March 29, Good Friday, Joseph Landry encouraged the Mayor 
to take all necessary precautions to prevent renewed rioting. He reminded the Mayor of 
the procedure Lavigueur had to follow for military assistance. In his military report to the 
Secretary of the Militia Council in Ottawa, Landry wrote, "I advised him (Lavigueur) to 
get the necessary requisition ready at once so that the same would not cause delay later. I 
even cited the Sections of the Militia Act to him and advised him to consult the City 
Attorney."78 
In his report, Landry explained that he had received numerous reports from 
various sources warning him of possible attacks on buildings in the city. The most 
disturbing report came from the Deputy Registrar, Antoine Gobeil, in charge of 
registering conscripts, who heard that the mob planned to target his office. Landry 
admitted that most of the threats amounted to little, but he did think it wise to defend the 
Registar's office in the Auditorium building. Landry wrote, "I specially asked the 
Mayor to take the necessary steps to do this, mentioning particularly a detail of police and 
firemen which could hold the mob pending the arrival of the military-this the Mayor 
promised to do."80 
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In the middle of the afternoon, Gobeil received a phone call from Trudel who 
assured him that there would be no rioting. During the inquest, the police chief said, "je 
ne croyais pas qu'apres l'echauffouree de la veille, ils (the rioters) recommenceraient, 
o i 
qu'en tout cas c'etait aux officiers a federaux qu'ils en voulaient." Trudel's phone call 
calmed Gobeil, who was worried after he received an anonymous call warning him of an 
attack on his building.82 At 6:30 p.m., Gobeil, confident that he had taken the necessary 
steps to avoid damage to his office, went home. At the inquest, Gobeil said,"je comptais 
que les precautions que j'avais prises en avertissant M.le Maire et les autorites militaires 
et que si c'etait necessaire toute la protection requise nous serait donnee." A few hours 
later, Gobeil, at home, received a phone call: his office was on fire. 
Sometime after 7 p.m., after an urgent phone call from the Mayor, Trudel arrived 
at Lavigueur's home. The Mayor informed him that the mob was congregating in Saint-
Roch and was planning to walk to the Upper Town. Trudel and Lavigueur, with the 
Mayor's requisition, went by car for signatures from Landry and two Justices of the 
Peace. Although Landry had advised the Mayor to get these signatures earlier, Lavigueur 
had not. Curiously, Trudel felt compelled to accompany the Mayor, even though he was 
not needed to sign the documents. Some people wondered, including the Mayor, why 
Trudel was not with his men, guarding the Auditorium. At the inquest, the Mayor said, 
"J'ai dit qu'il devait rester sur les lieux et commander ses hommes et il ne l'a pas fait."84 
After the initial phone call from the Mayor, Trudel immediately phoned Sergeant 
Wellman and told him to assemble a group of policemen to defend the Auditorium. 
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Although the Mayor asked Trudel to place as many as 40 to 50 men , according to 
Lavigueur the police chief responded, "c'etait impossible de 'mettre' autant d'hommes 
que cela, mais que, dans tous les cas, mon organization serait bonne et que tout 
marcherait bien." Trudel told Wellman to put four men outside the Registrar's office 
with strict orders not to allow any entrance. In addition, two men were to be placed 
outside the Auditorium, while 20 officers were to remain hidden from the public. A few 
days after the riots, in a letter written to Trudel, Sergeant Wellman explained that he had 
been unable to place four men outside the Registrar's office because they had been 
locked out of the Auditorium building. When the rioting began, according to Wellman, he 
had one of his men call the military twice for reinforcements but they did not arrive 
quickly enough. He said that the ten men who guarded the Auditorium door were 
overtaken by 200 to 300 rioters who stormed the building, setting part of it on fire. At the 
time, the other sixteen men were spread out in the crowd trying to stop rioters from 
throwing projectiles or firing their guns. 7 Wellman writes, "Nous nous sommes fait 
deborder a l'endroit que nous occupions. Si nous avions eu la moindre assistance, nous 
aurions reussi a disperser les manifestants." 
Earlier that night, a few hundred people from Saint-Roch walked up to Quebec 
City's Upper Town while singing "La Marseillaise" and "O Canada." At around 9 p.m., 
they peacefully passed the Auditorium, on their way to the newspaper offices of 
L 'Evenement and the Chronicle. Once they arrived at the Chronicle building, the mob 
pillaged the office of its valuables, including a telegraph machine, a clock and a moose's 
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head. They then broke all the windows of the L 'Evenement building. It appears the 
mob's motivation for attacking these buildings was the two papers' pro-conscription 
positions. Landry, Lavigueur, and Trudel had met to sign the mayor's requisition at 
Landry's nearby office; they helplessly watched the mob destroy the two offices. After 
observing the rioters act with impunity, the three authorities were convinced that the 
military was needed to establish order. With the requisition in hand, Trudel and the 
mayor went to find the two Justices of the Peace. 
When the mob returned to the Auditorium, there was a large crowd of about 8,000 
people, mostly curious bystanders. Some of the rioters began throwing projectiles, 
breaking windows of the building and hitting some of the policemen. Soon after 9:30 
p.m., one of the rioters ordered the mob to charge the building. It was at this point that the 
rioters broke down the door and invaded the Registrar's Office, overwhelming Wellman 
and his men. They ripped up office documents and threw them out the window while the 
crowd outside cheered them on. They also set the office on fire. Soon after, firemen 
arrived at the scene and eventually put out the fire despite having two of their water lines 
cut by the rioters. 
Just before 10 p.m., the Mayor returned to Landry's office with a requisition 
signed by two Justices of the Peace, Edward Foley and Alx. J. Messervy. Landry, 
satisfied that all protocol had been followed, ordered Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Beaubien 
and his soldiers who formed the Composite Battalion to meet the Mayor at the 
Auditorium.90 Fifteen minutes later, Landry reported that the battalion had formed a line 
in front of the Auditorium between the building and the crowd which he described as 
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being "orderly though somewhat noisy."91 The troops' presence immediately calmed 
most of the crowd. Considering the damage already done, the Mayor decided that to 
read the Riot Act—allowing the military to shoot at the crowd—was not necessary. By 
midnight, with the crowd dispersing, Lavigueur gave Beaubien a signed statement that 
said the soldiers were no longer needed. Landry reported that the town was quiet by the 
early morning of March 30. In addition, he wrote to the Militia Council, that he had 
received word from Gobeil informing him, amazingly, that few of his papers pertaining 
to the Military Service Act had been destroyed by the rioters. 
Almost immediately following the rioting, critics, including Robert Borden, 
accused civil authorities of failing to maintain the peace. The most popular target was 
Emile Trudel. In a letter to the Mayor, Trudel refused to accept any responsibility for the 
rioting; instead, he put the blame on others. He thought that Capitaine Desrochers should 
have ensured that the Auditorium door would be open so police could have better 
defended the building. He complained that the military had not arrived in appropriate 
time. He also grumbled that his force was severely undermanned and that he could only 
commit 26 officers to guard the building. He wrote, "II etait impossible aussi d'envoyer 
toutes nos forces a un endroit ou Ton apprehendait des troubles et de laisser de la sorte le 
reste de la ville au merci des manifestants." 
Despite Trudel's claim of innocence at the inquest, one can understand why he 
and the Mayor's actions were questioned. It is still not clear why the Mayor waited until 
violence broke out to prepare the requisition for use of military authority. His judgment 
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insistence on preparing for more violence, 25 phone calls from citizens asking for 
protection, as well as the warnings, including that from Gobeil, that there could be an 
attack at the Auditorium. Landry's frustration with the Mayor's tentativeness and Police 
inaction was explicit in his military report. He wrote, "No effective Police action was 
being taken by the Municipal Police and, in spite of my having cautioned him that 
morning, the Mayor had no requisition and did not produce one until 9:57 p.m."94 When 
the Brigadier-General saw how the mere presence of the troops had calmed the rioters, he 
must have been further irritated by the Mayor's tardiness. 
Trudel's decision-making was also peculiar. For most of the day on the 29th, the 
police chief appeared to underestimate the real threat of renewed attacks by the rioters. 
This attitude was most pronounced when Trudel reassured Gobeil that the rioters would 
be quiet and that there would be no attack on the Registrar's office. In addition, the police 
chiefs refusal to assist his men at the Auditorium, until he appeared with the military 
after 10 p.m. is difficult to understand. While traveling past the Auditorium with the 
Mayor, Trudel had two opportunities to join his policemen. However, both times he said 
that he should stay with the Mayor. At the inquest, Trudel's inability to give a credible 
reason for his absence from his men made the Chief appear to have performed 
unprofessionally. 
Perhaps if the civic authorities had made better choices on March 29 much of the 
violence could have been avoided. Instead, rioters did as they wished with practically no 
recrimination, and their success seems to have encouraged the future violence. 
Concurrently, in their incapacity to effectively keep the peace, the civic authorities lost 
Landry military report, 30 March 1918. 
Trudel testimony, Enquete du coroner , 42-43. 
39 
the federal government's trust. This would have serious consequences. After the Good 
Friday rioting, the federal government removed Lavigeur and Trudel's authority to 
establish safety in the city, and invested it in the military. 
Ill EASTER SATURDAY 1918 
On Saturday March 30, Joseph Landry visited the Mayor at his office. The 
Brigadier-General explained to Lavigueur that ending the riots was no longer the Mayor's 
responsibility. Earlier in the morning, Landry had received a phone call from Robert 
Borden, who, worried about the situation in Quebec City, told the Brigadier-General to 
take all possible measures to stop the violence. The Mayor agreed to relinquish control of 
the city and promised to cooperate with the soldiers. Furthermore, Lavigueur placed 
Trudel and his men under the command of the military.96 At 12:15 p.m. Landry phoned 
Ottawa and asked for 1,000 additional troops, which would increase the total number of 
soldiers in the city to 1,500. The government ordered soldiers to Quebec. The prime 
minister decided that the highest ranking francophone officer in Canada, General 
Lessard, would command the troops once they arrived on Sunday, March 31. After 
Borden gave his orders to Landry, he telegraphed Lessard, who was in Halifax, and told 
him to go immediately to Quebec City.97 Lessard also arrived on the 31 st. Until then, 
Landry tried his best to keep the city quiet. 
Although there were rumors of possible attacks on buildings around the city, there 
was little action for most of Saturday. The soldiers spent the day defending prominent 
buildings and patrolling the streets. At around 8:30 p.m., a crowd gathered in the Lower 
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Town and began to walk towards the Military Drill Hall, just off Grande-Allee in the 
Upper Town.98 For the Quebecers, the Drill Hall was symbolic because it was the first 
place draft dodgers were sent if caught by the Dominion Police. At about 9 p.m., 
Lieutenant Colonel Girouard reported that though the crowd had reached la Grande-
Allee, it was mostly under control. Girouard wrote, "they confined themselves to 
shouting abuse and firing snow-balls, and pieces of ice."99 
About an hour later, the crowd, which was estimated to number 3,000 became 
increasingly unruly. Girouard's soldiers were losing patience because the mob targeted 
them with ice, bottles, and stones. After he was hit twice on the head with ice, Girouard 
read the Riot Act.100 In his report to General Landry, Girouard wrote, "I then ordered 
my men to load but not in any circumstances to fire without receiving a specific order 
from myself and to be given by me only."101 Eventually, Girouard ordered Lieutenant-
Colonel Montserrat, and his detachment of mounted artillery, to break up the crowd, 
"which he did very effectively by charging at full trot, then returning and cleaning the 
sidewalks on Grande-Allee in front of our men." These cavalry charges mildly injured 
some civilians. 
After 1 a.m., the mob ransacked the Brousseau & Brothers hardware store, which 
was cordoned off by the municipal police. As during the previous night, the police did 
little to stop the rioters while they stole weapons—mainly guns and knives—which they 
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distributed to the crowd.104 Le Devoir, wrote, "la possession de ces armes par les 
manifestants est inquietante car on s'attend a de nouveaux troubles."105 After breaking all 
the windows of a streetcar, and engaging in a few more skirmishes near the Legislative 
Assembly building, the rioters withdrew and the streets were quiet.106 
In front of an excited and sometimes violent crowd, it appears the officers and the 
soldiers acted with prudence. Landry applauded the soldiers' discipline, "on a jete des 
pierres et des glacons aux soldats, on les a insultes pendant une partie de la soiree. Les 
soldats, les troupes ont fait de leur mieux possible pour les disperser, sans avoir a tirer en 
aucune facon. Plusieurs soldats ont ete blesses." Former Liberal Senator Phillipe-
Auguste Choquette, who encouraged the rioters and the curious to go home that night, 
also commended the troops. At the inquest, he said, "les soldats se sont bien conduits, 
sans aucune provocation a l'exception de ces paroles deplacees que le militaire a dit je 
crois a ces soldats plutot qu'au public. Tout s'est passe paisiblement et nous n'avons rien 
eu a regretter."108 
IV EASTER SUNDAY 1918 
On the morning of Easter Sunday March 31 st, most from Quebec City were 
sitting in church. The night before, Cardinal Begin, the archbishop of Quebec, had 
written a letter to all the Rectors of the Parishes of Quebec. He wrote, "we beg of you, 
Father Rector, when reading this advice tomorrow from the pulpit, to recommend calm 
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and moderation to your parishioners, and to exhort them to be on their guard against 
thoughtless impulses that cannot result in any good."109 Despite the Church's appeal for 
peace, the rioting continued by afternoon. 
It began with a violent encounter between soldiers and rioters when the former 
were trying to remove weapons from Hermann Young's store. The rioters yelled insults 
and threw projectiles at the soldiers injuring a few. When the soldiers left the store some 
rioters followed and continued to bombard them with ice and bricks. 110It appears that one 
of the soldiers, without orders, lost his temper and shot one round at the mob. Another 
soldier used his bayonette to stab a man in the crowd. Two rioters were hurt, both with 
mild injuries to their arms.111 
All afternoon and night, hundreds of fresh soldiers, mostly Anglophones from 
Toronto and the Western provinces, arrived in the city. Under the command of Major 
Gooderham Mitchell, a 39-year-old General Staff Officer who had seen action on the 
Western Front, the Ontario soldiers arrived by train from Toronto. At the inquest, 
Mitchell remembered cautioning his troops on the train: 
I warned them that they would probably not get as much cheering as they had at 
other times, but they were to remember that they were in a responsible position, 
that a great deal depended on the way they acted, and I asked them individually 
and collectively to bear in mind at all times they were to do nothing except on the 
1 1 9 
instructions of those over them. 
Some in Quebec City welcomed the men, hoping that they would end the violence 
and restore order. Others were uneasy with a group of armed young Anglophones 
patrolling their streets. General Lessard later explained that he had no choice but to 
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summon fresh troops from Ontario. Lessard said the French speaking Quebec soldiers 
needed relief because they had been on duty for three days straight. According to the 
Major General, there were simply not enough Francophone soldiers to replace those on 
guard.113 
These new troops saw action almost immediately. That night the Toronto 
battalion cordoned off the Upper Town, where most of the past rioting had taken place, 
from the Lower Town where most of the rioters lived. At the moment when the soldiers 
and some congregating rioters appeared as though they would confront each other, the 
rioters' were distracted by a man who approached them out of the darkness: it was 
Armand Lavergne.114 
Earlier that night, around 7 p.m., Lavergne had received a phone call from an old 
friend, Alleyn Taschereau, who had been sent by the Minister of Justice to help 
Lieutenant-Colonel Machin gather information for his reports to Ottawa. Taschereau 
insisted that Lavergne, who had not been involved in the rioting, meet with him, Machin, 
and Lieutenant-Colonel Carruthers at the Chateau Frontenac. Lavergne, who was fighting 
a flu bug, walked over to the hotel. According to Lavergne, Machin, whom he had never 
met, asked him for his thoughts on the cause of the riots. Lavergne responded, "Mon 
Colonel, pour moi ces troubles sont causes par la betise et l'incurie dont on a fait preuve 
dans le choix de la Police Federale. On a choisi des individus de la respectabilite plus que 
douteuse."115 Lavergne believed the rioters were not revolting against the conscription 
law, but rather its application in Quebec. The lawyer also argued the soldiers' presence in 
the streets of the city was a direct provocation to its population. He felt that the rioting 
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would not end until the soldiers were withdrawn. Machin explained to Lavergne that he 
had received information that the mob was assembling in the Lower Town. He asked the 
lawyer if he would go and speak to the crowd.116 The three government officials knew 
only Lavergne had enough influence over the people to calm them and encourage them to 
return home. In his report to Borden, Machin writes: 
I explained to him(Lavergne) that the interview was entirely a personal one; and 
that while I happened to be the Director of the Military Service Branch of the 
Department of Justice and had come down to see the nature and extent of the 
damage to our office, I had no official status in talking to him He suggested 
to me that some compromise should be made with the military authorities, and I 
informed him that I had absolutely no power or status and that if he had any 
remarks to make to the G.O.C. he must see the officer himself, but what I had 
suggested to him, was purely personal from one man to another in the cause of the 
innocent.117 
In a letter to Robert Borden, Alleyn Taschereau reiterated Machin's position, 
writing, "it was never mentioned to him (Lavergne) that any official was speaking for the 
Government. Our conversation was a friendly one with the intention of helping the 
general public."118 At the inquest, Lavergne described his interpretation of the meeting. 
When he and Machin discussed the possible termination of the work of the Dominion 
Police Force in the city, the lawyer described Machin as saying, "C'est ma part, et je m'y 
engage. Ces gens la ne seront plus employes." Lavergne believed he had Machin's 
moral guarantee to withdraw the troops from the city. According to Lavergne, Machin 
had said, "Quant a retirer les troupes, je n'en ai pas l'autorite mais je ferai tout mon 
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possible." Regardless of which version one believes, Lavergne decided to speak to the 
crowd with the firm belief that he had the approval of the Canadian government. 
While Lavergne was walking to Place Jacques-Cartier, the rioters pillaged the 
Martineau store of its merchandise. Unable to obtain any weapons, (the military had 
1 99 
already removed all armaments), the rioters set the store on fire and fled the scene. A 
half hour later, the mob burnt down the Samson and Fillion store after stealing its 
weapons.123 On their way to Place Jacques Cartier, these same rioters encountered 
Lavergne. The lawyer warned them that the soldiers would not hesitate to shoot. 
However, they refused to listen telling him to mind his own business. Lavergne tried to 
reason with the rioters. He explained that he was a well-known anti-conscriptionist. He 
said, "Je suis ici en mission. Je viens de la part des autorites, je sais ce que vous 
demandez-on va retirer les detectives dont vous vous plaignez et demain les troupes ne 
seront plus dans les rues."124 According to Lavergne, the majority of the crowd embraced 
his words and followed him to Place Jacques Cartier where a larger group of people were 
gathering. At approximately 9 p.m., Lavergne addressed a crowd of 4,000 to 5,000 
Quebecers. He told them that if they were peaceful that night then the detectives and the 
soldiers would pull-out of the city. However, with great consequence, he also said that if 
the government failed to keep its promises, he would return the following night to Place 
Jacques Cartier. If that were to happen, Lavergne told the crowd that, "vous ferez ce que 
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vous voudrez."125 In parting, Lavergne's final words were, "Maintenant je vous demande 
une chose ce soir avant de partir: Je vous demande votre parole d'honneur de vous 
disperser, d'etre paisible et de vous fier a l'honneur du Gouvernement que je 
represente."126 According to Lavergne, a satisfied crowd went peacefully to their homes. 
A few days later at the coroner's inquest, some witnesses argued that Lavergne's all-or-
nothing speech, full of empty promises that were impossible to guarantee, contributed to 
the increased hostility among the rioters.The following day, when the promises were not 
met, the rioters took Lavergne's words literally—they did what they wanted. 
V EASTER MONDAY 1918 
On Monday April 1, 1918, Le Devoir's two headlines read, "Les autorites 
s'engagent a retirer les troupes de Quebec", and "Le calme renait a Quebec." Both 
statements proved to be entirely incorrect.127 In the same newspaper, an article written 
from Ottawa described Canada's capital city as consumed by political discussion 
concerning the riots. One French speaking Liberal from Quebec, referring to the massacre 
of unarmed civilians by the Russian Tsar's army, was ominously quoted as saying, "le 
Canada est la seule des possessions britanniques qui n'avait pas encore eu son 'bloody 
Sunday'".128 The country would not have to wait long to achieve such a regrettable feat. 
On this densely foggy Easter Monday, Armand Lavergne walked to the Chateau 
Frontenac to speak to General Lessard, an old acquaintance. He pleaded with the General 
to hide his soldiers from public view. According to Lavergne, Lessard's reply was, "Non, 
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il est trop tard, j 'ai la force et je m'en sers et je vais disperser tout rassemblement."129 
Lavergne retorted, "General vous allez tout recommencer et il y aura du sang verse 
certainement. La population va croire que c'est une provocation."130 Lessard warned 
Lavergne to stay away from Place Jacques Cartier and implied the lawyer would be 
stopped that night if he tried to speak to the crowd. Earlier that day, when the Mayor 
asked the General to hide his soldiers from the public, Lessard had told him, "Les ordres 
sont tres precis. Je ne connais pas les engagements ou les pourparlers de Lavergne avec le 
colonel Machin; mais Machin n'est pas autorise a traiter avec qui que ce soit. Les troupes 
descendront et se placeront sur la place du marche." The General's resolve to deploy 
troops was further strengthened when the military received intelligence suggesting there 
would be more attacks on buildings in the city, including two hardware stores near Place 
Jacques Cartier.132 Consequently, at approximately 6 p.m. that night, Lessard sent 1,200 
soldiers into Quebec City's Lower Town. 
The mobilization of soldiers should not have been surprising to the Quebecers. 
Throughout the day, the military had placed signs across the city warning the public that 
those who participated in any form of public demonstration would be arrested and 
imprisoned. The military even cautioned citizens they could be injured or killed if they 
were at the wrong place at the wrong time. In addition, Lessard had placed warnings in 
every prominent newspaper demanding the public stay away from the rioters by 
remaining at home. At the inquest, Lavergne, who on the Monday night stayed home 
fearing the crowd might riot if he was arrested, argued that the Quebecers did not take 
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these warnings seriously because they were not signed and had no official government 
stamp. Lessard, who had thought the lawyer's argument absurd, replied, "Je ne crois pas 
qu'il y ait une seule personne dans toute la ville de Quebec qui ne savait pas quelles 
etaient les mesures de rigueur qui seraient prises-sans sceau et sans signature. Elles 
savaient tres bien ou elles en etaient."1 
Major Robert Rodgers commanded the soldiers that were sent to the Lower Town. 
The force consisted of 580 Royal Canadian Regiment, 400 Royal Canadian Engineers, 
100 Royal Canadian Dragoons, and 100 Machine Gun Company with 10 machine guns. 
Almost all of these soldiers were Anglophones, conscripted under the Military Service 
Act, and, excluding the officers, had no battlefield experience. At the inquest, Rodgers 
explained, "I got very strict orders to avoid a clash if possible and if possible not to use 
any force, but to keep a mob from collecting. I spoke to the men at the time they went out 
and told them under no consideration were they to load their rifles until they got an order 
from a senior officer." 
At around 8 p.m., a large crowd was congregating at the Place Jacques Cartier in 
Saint-Roch. The soldiers tried to disperse the crowd in a peaceful manner. Rodgers 
explained his approach, "If we saw two or three talking, I told them (his soldiers), 'don't 
bother them; if you see seven or eight young fellows and they are nasty, why I say go up 
and ask them to move on." At around 9 p.m., the rioters hid in the back streets of the 
square, after stealing weapons and ammunition from the stores of Mr. Cantin and Mr. 
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Lajeunesse. They threw bricks, stones, and ice at the soldiers. The soldiers struggled 
to identify those throwing projectiles because of the thick fog, which reduced visibility to 
approximately 15 meters. At one point, a rioter shot his revolver five times at a soldier 
who was trying to apprehend him. However, the revolver malfunctioned and the soldier 
was not hurt.139 Shortly after, the Royal Canadian Dragoons, on horseback, rushed the 
rioters with saber in hand down a side street. In this manoeuvre, one soldier was hit in the 
head by a brick and required medical treatment. 4 By 10:30 p.m., the Dragoons withdrew 
their exhausted horses after rushing the crowd for over two hours. On the Boulevard 
Langelier, some soldiers were fired upon by snipers who were hiding on rooftops and 
behind snowbanks. After two soldiers were hit by bullets, Rodgers sent in 
reinforcements: 25 soldiers under the command of Major Mitchell. 
When Mitchell moved his soldiers west towards the intersection of Saint-Vallier, 
Bagot and Saint-Joseph, the rioters shot at them. When the troops arrived at the 
intersection, they had their eyes on two large crowds of rioters—one which was straight-
ahead, down Bagot Street; the other to their right, at the intersection of Saint-Vallier and 
Laviolette. Mitchell had his troops stop, while he proceeded to speak to what he thought 
was the more reasonable of the two crowds, at Laviolette. As Mitchell approached the 
crowd, he realized six municipal policemen were experiencing difficulty holding back the 
rioters. Xavier Blouin, Constable for the City Police, pleaded to the crowd, "Reculez pour 
1'amour du bon Dieu, les soldats s'en viennent vous allez voir ce qui va vous arriver." 
According to Blouin, one rioter adamantly replied, "C'est pas des balles qui piquent c'est 
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des cartouches blanches 9a ne nous attrapera pas."142 When Mitchell, asked the crowd to 
disperse in English, they responded by heckling and by bombarding him with ice and 
projectiles.143 As the crowd refused to listen, Mitchell returned to his soldiers who by 
then had received reinforcements. At this point, just after 10 p.m., Mitchell's force 
consisted of approximately 55 men.144 A half hour later, the General Staff Officer ordered 
his troops to cross Saint-Vallier and to clear the rioters off Bagot street. While the 
soldiers crossed the street, they were shot at by the mob down Bagot. One sergeant was 
wounded. Sometime after 10:30 p.m., the Canadian army opened fire on the Quebecers. 
Although the military read the Riot Act earlier that night at Place Jacques Cartier, 
it does not appear that they re-read it before opening fire. Several witnesses, including a 
few municipal police constables, testified that they did not see or hear the military read 
the Act. During the inquest, Lavergne criticized Mitchell for failing to follow the law by 
reading the document. Mitchell, who had not received a copy of the Act, despite 
Rodgers' claims otherwise, replied, "Is it necessary to read it before any action is taken in 
any part." Major Barclay, the lawyer representing the military, argued Mitchell and his 
officers had the authority to open fire without reading the Act.145 
It remains unclear who gave the orders for the soldiers to shoot. At the inquest, 
Rodgers thought Mitchell gave the orders. However, Mitchell denied this. Although he 
was the officer who stopped the shooting, Mitchell admitted he was unsure which officer 
had ordered the soldiers to begin. Mitchell explained that any officer under his command 
technically had the authority to make such a decision. The General Staff Officer said, 
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"The officer in charge of these men would be at liberty to, in carrying out my 
instructions, to use his judgment in matters of that sort. Under the circumstances I 
consider that the troops were quite justified in replying to the fire as they did."14 
Although there was one witness who claimed the soldiers shot first (Dion), all other 
witnesses at the inquest testified that the troops responded to the rioters' initial shooting 
(Blouin, the police men, Caouette, Mitchell, Rodgers). In addition, all the newspapers 
reported that the rioters had begun the shooting. 
Around 11 p.m., after hearing nearby gun shots, Major Rodgers made his way to 
the intersection where the soldiers opened fire. By this time, most of the crowd had 
dispersed. However, there were still some brazen rioters who continued to shoot at the 
soldiers through the fog. At about midnight, after five shots were fired in Rodgers' 
direction, the Major used a Lewis machine gun that had been recently brought up by his 
soldiers to the corner. It appears Rodgers' goal in using the gun, that shot 750 rounds per 
minute, was to create a "psychological effect;" that is, to scare the rioters, not hurt them. 
At the inquest, Rodgers explained how he used the Lewis gun: 
They (the rioters) had gone down that street (Laviolette). So I saw no one in front 
of me and I got down on the ground myself and saw that the machine gun was 
traversed as I thought into the brick wall or very close to it, and I got an 
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interpreter to yell at them three or four times that we were going to start the 
machine gun. There were three or four shots around the corner; So I started the 
machine gun and stopped it just like that (the witness snaps his fingers)... .1 should 
judge it ran about three-quarters of the drum, that is, about 36 shots were fired.149 
According to Rodgers, the machine gun was fired only once at three feet off the 
ground, towards a building. However, Isidore Caouette, Ovide Landy, and Alfred 
Boucher, all municipal Police officers said they heard the machine gun fire twice.151 
Wilfred Dion testified the machine gun, "a tire deux fois, a ma connaissance, et la 
1 S9 
troisieme fois, je l'ai entendu tirer lorsque j'etais au telephone." Dion said the machine 
gun stopped almost immediately in the first two firings. With no other evidence to 
support Dion's claim the machine gun was fired three times, it is possible he heard rifle 
fire the "third time" when he was on the telephone. 
It seems the machine gun played a minor role in the riots. There is strong 
evidence suggesting only one gun was used, and was fired either once or twice for a few 
seconds when a few people were in the streets. In addition, there is no proof that the 
machine gun caused casualties. It did not play a role in the deaths of the four victims. In 
the end, as was Rogers' intention, it is likely that the machine gun's primary function was 
psychological. Nevertheless, perhaps to sell copies, some of the newspapers 
sensationalized the story of the machine gun(s). On April 2nd, Le Devoir wrote, "Non 
contents de se servir de fusils, ils prirent des mitrailleuses et les braquerent sur la foule. 
Un corps complet de mitrailleurs, descendu specialement a cet fin, a ete ires actif."153 Le 
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Soleil described the machine gun firing several times at the crowd.154 La Presse said the 
soldiers replied to the mob's initial fire with three machine guns.155 
Sometime past midnight, after the machine gun had been used, the streets were 
quiet. The next morning, April 2, the results of the rioting were sobering: 62 rioters had 
been arrested, hundreds of revolvers and other weapons had been seized, numerous 
civilians and soldiers had been injured, and unfortunately, four civilians had been 
killed.156 
VI AFTERMATH 
Although Quebecers were saddened by the tragic events in 1918, most 
condemned the rioting. Over the course of the riots, numerous Quebec City residents had 
asked Trudel, Lavigueur and Landry to increase security for both private and public 
property. Furthermore, many fled the city until order was re-established.157 Quebec 
parliamentarians, although critical of the Dominion Police Force, were also unanimously 
opposed to the rioting. George Parent, a member of Parliament for Quebec City, called 
the violence and vandalism, "damnable acts." Ernest Lapointe, another Quebec MP, 
said, "there was no justification for rioting or unlawful resort to violence." 159A11 of the 
Quebec newspapers, both French and English, also criticized the rioting. Le Devoir 
wrote, "les organisateurs d'emeutes et de resistances violentes a la loi sont les pires 
ennemis des jeunes gens qu'ils pretendent proteger et qui seront leurs premieres 
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victimes."160 La Presse said the rioters unjustly destroyed property which caused disgust 
among ordinary citizens.1 l Le Soleil wrote, "nous savons que l'immense majorite des 
citoyens desapprouve et regrette la violence et les desordres produits par la suite."162 
Quebecers were more ambivalent about the military's role during the riots. 
George Parent described the soldiers as having "behaved gallantly," although, the MP 
also said "a few of them took pleasure in doing a little more than was necessary."163 Most 
of the English-language newspapers, and some French, such as L 'Evenement, argued the 
military had acted appropriately. This newspaper wrote, "les soldats ont agi avec calme et 
patience, et que ce n'est quand ils furent pousses a bout qu'ils firent feu."164 L 'Action 
Catholique wrote, "c'est grace aux mesures si bien prises par le general Lessard, c'est 
grace au tact et au jugement dont il fait preuve, que les pertes de vie ont ete reduites au 
minimum." However, other French newspapers were critical of the soldiers' actions on 
the Monday night. On April 2nd, the headline in Le Devoir was, "Les soldats de Toronto 
font feu sur la foule."166 A few pages later, an article described the soldiers as shooting "a 
1 (si 
l'aventure" and "sans pitie." More virulently , La Presse wrote, "En faisant entrer trop 
tot en action les bai'onnettes, les fusils, la cavalerie et les mitrailleuses, elles ont trop fait 
croire qu'elles avaient hate de tirer sur la population de Quebec." 
On April 2nd, in an effort to avoid further clashes with the rioters, the military 
sent its largest contingent of soldiers to patrol the streets and to make more arrests. 
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However, the city remained quiet. After five days of violence, with little to show for its 
action, it appears the mob had decided it was in its best interest to obey the law by 
staying at home. Two days later, Robert Borden used the War Measures Act, which had 
been passed in the early days of the war, to put Quebec City under martial law. The War 
Measures Act suspended civil liberties and made official the military's supreme 
authority. It also legalized retroactively all interventions the military had made from the 
beginning of the riots. The retroactive nature of the law was important because it 
protected all officers and soldiers from prosecution for any illegal acts. 
On April 3rd and 4th, the majority of the Quebecers implicated in the rioting were 
released from prison, due to lack of evidence. Even weeks after the rioting, the authorities 
gave only a few fines and did not charge anyone with serious crimes. The authorities 
speculated as to the identity of the riot leaders, including the possibility that they were 
from outside Quebec City. Many, including the Mayor and various parliamentarians1 9, 
believed the leaders were from Montreal. In a letter to the Justice Minister, Robert 
Borden wrote, "the source of the Quebec disturbance was really in Montreal; that there is 
a secret organization in Montreal which is carrying on the work of fomenting these 
disturbances; and that there is good reason to believe that German money is assisting the 
work."170 Some even thought the communists were linked to the riots. General Lessard 
was convinced that one of the riot leaders was a Russian staying in Quebec City. The 
Russian was shadowed by the military for several days after the violence.171 Ultimately, 
there was little substantial evidence that could be used to arrest potential leaders inside or 
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outside the city. Few of the rioters who had vandalized buildings, pillaged stores, thrown 
projectiles and fired guns were reprimanded by the law. 
The military held a Court of Inquiry, on April 3rd, to determine whether the 
soldiers, during the shooting on the Monday night, had used soft explosive bullets, more 
casually known as "Dum-Dums." The coroner who had examined the four victims' 
bodies declared the wounds could only have been caused by explosive bullets. Outlawed 
by the 1899 Hague Convention, soft explosive bullets were known to cause larger and 
more devastating wounds. The Court of Inquiry's verdict was that the coroner's charge 
was without foundation.172 A few days later, at the inquest, the soft explosive bullets 
issue was once again raised. Dr.Albert Marois, a practising doctor with 34 years 
experience who had examined all four victims, testified he believed the four were killed 
by "Dum-Dums." Nevertheless, Francis D. Lafferty, a ballistics expert, argued regular 
rifle bullets could have caused the four victims' wounds depending on the distance 
between the victims and the rifles. In addition, Lafferty claimed that if bullets had 
ricocheted off a wall, the results could be irregular wounds. 
The coroner's inquest into the deaths of the four victims began on April 8. 
Georges-William Jolicoeur, the coroner for the district of Quebec, presided over the 
court. There were six jurors, all but one francophone, and various lawyers, including 
Armand Lavergne who represented the Demeule family. By April 13, after 30 witnesses 
had testified, the jury made its decision. They read the following to the court: 
Le jury est d'opinion que, considerant que les personnes tuees en cette occasion 
etaient innocentes de toute participation a cette emeute qui devait son origine a la 
maniere inhabile et grossiere avec laquelle les officiers federaux charges de 
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1'execution de la loi de conscription envers les insoumis exercaient leurs 
fonctions, il serait du devoir du gouvernement d'indemniser raisonnablement les 
families des victimes que Ton a prouvees innocentes et sans armes a ce moment, 
ainsi que d'indemniser ceux qui ont souffert des dommages de cette emeute.174 
The jury added that it regretted the events that had occurred in the city and 
condemned the irrational acts performed by the rioters, some of whom were thought to 
have come from outside of the city. In the end, it was the city of Quebec, not the federal 
government, that spent more than $200,000 dollars repairing damaged buildings, 
particularly the Auditorium. To this day, the federal government, likely because it 
continues to feel unaccountable, has not offered compensation to the victims' families. 
On April 5th, Parliament debated the cause of the Quebec City riots. Like the 
jurors, almost all the French Canadian members from Quebec argued the rioting was 
inspired by the Dominion Police's misapplication of the Military Service Act. On the 
other hand, the Anglophone members felt the riots were sparked by Quebec's disdain for 
the conscription law. The likely cause for the rioting was a combination of a few factors. 
There is no doubt many Quebecers were outraged by the perceived abuses committed by 
the Dominion Police Force. The attacks on Belanger and Evanturel demonstrated the 
rioters' hostility towards how the law had been applied by these officers of dubious 
character. However, some Quebecers' revulsion for conscription itself was also a possible 
cause for the rioting. After all, as seen in the spring and summer riots of 1917 and the 
high rate of draft dodging, many Quebecers were not timid about breaking the law.'73 
When considering the willingness of many Quebecers to resist conscription, it is easier to 
explain the prolonged violence, the vandalism of newspaper buildings, and the looting of 
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hardware stores that occurred during Quebec City's five day riots. In addition, 
economically, the government's wartime economy, which had introduced income tax to 
raise money for the war, and which had caused food, clothing and fuel prices to soar 
added to rising tensions amongst the mostly working-class rioters. From this perspective, 
it is perhaps not a surprise that a little incident, such as the arrest of Joseph Mercier, 
could have developed into one of Canadian history's bloodiest riots. 
Forgetting and Remembering the Quebec City Riots 
In early April 1918, Thomas Vien, a Member of Parliament for Lotbiniere 
(Quebec), reflected on how he thought Canadians, in and outside of Quebec, would 
remember the recent disturbances in Quebec City. Standing in the House of Commons, 
he said: 
59 
For the outsider the incident will have only an historic importance. Many will 
come to Quebec to visit the spot where it occurred, to see the places where the 
machine guns were laid on the mob and to see the streets where the men fell. But 
we Quebecers who live there shall constantly have a remembrance of the disgrace 
that took place last week.177 
Only a few days after the riots, Mr.Vien predicted that outsiders would not 
remember the events in the same way as Quebecers. For those who came from beyond 
Quebec, the memory of the riots would be elicited by visiting the site which would 
produce an artificial and temporary remembrance. Conversely, for Quebecers who lived 
through the riots and continued to live with its legacy, the memory would be visceral and 
permanent. 
It is beyond the scope of this work to comment on the accuracy of Mr.Vien's 
prediction, as the record does not provide sufficient evidence to show how much 
Quebecers have individually remembered or forgotten the riots. It is possible, however, 
through the historiographical record to examine whether historians were producing works 
on the subject of the Quebec City riots. This chapter will show that Quebec's 
francophone community of historians displayed little interest in remembering the riots in 
the first forty years after the First World War. By the dawn of the Quiet Revolution, in 
response to shifts in Quebec's intellectual and social climate, the community's amateur 
historians began to re-discover the story. Soon after, one of them, historian Jean 
Provencher, published Quebec: sous la loi des mesures de guerre 1918 (1971), the only 
book to be written on the topic, and his subsequent play Quebec, printemps 1918 (1974). 
These two works, reflections of the larger society in which Provencher lived, would most 
profoundly revive the story of the Quebec City riots. 
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I MES ENFANTS, SALUEZ LES BRAVES QUI PASSENT 
It was not until the 1940s that Quebec's two French-language universities 
established history departments, a decade that also saw the founding of the first 
professional association of Quebec historians, as well as the first professional historical 
journal to examine Quebec history. Compared to English Canada, the relatively slow 
development of the discipline's institutionalization in Francophone Quebec can be 
attributed to a certain degree to the control of the Catholic Church as well as to the few 
Francophones who had real economic power.178 Nevertheless, before the 1940s the seeds 
for Francophone Quebec's academic historical community were planted. Historians such 
as Lionel Groulx, Thomas Chapais, and Gustave Lanctot were all part of this community, 
scholars who were not quite "professional" but who had some methodological training 
and a firm grasp of the literature on the historical discipline.179 However, while showing 
interest in more modern approaches to writing history, the historians in this period, both 
laymen and clerics, had difficulty agreeing on whether history was more science or art 
and what role God played in affecting the past. 
Up until the Quiet Revolution, Quebec's historical community was generally 
more concerned about studying the history of New France and of the years directly after 
its fall than writing about more modern topics like conscription and the Quebec City 
riots.1 ' The school textbooks of the period, many of which were written by clerics with 
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little training in the historical discipline, generally encouraged students to take pride in 
their French-Canadian and Catholic heritage through the glorification of Quebec's 
heroes, particularly from the pre-Conquest period.182 Consequently, these textbooks saw 
the First World War as a positive experience and devoted considerably more space to 
remembering the contributions of the Royal 22nd battalion, rather than to the divisive 
story of the conscription crisis and the riots. For example, the textbook Histoire du 
Canada (1919), that mentioned conscription in one sentence and did not discuss the riots, 
asked its readers to worship the soldiers of the 22nd battalion.183 A few years later, Precis 
d 'histoire du Canada (1928), written by Abbe Joseph Rutche, commented on 
conscription only to explain that the Canadian government introduced the measure in 
order to raise more soldiers for its army. 4 Similarly, Fathers Paul-Emile Farley and 
Gustave Lamarche's Histoire du Canada (1933) devoted seven pages to the story of the 
war, one paragraph to conscription, and nothing to the riots. 
After the Second World War, Monpays: histoire de Canada(\954), by the cleric 
Guy Laviolette, briefly mentions conscription but mainly celebrates the accomplishments 
of the Royal 22nd battalion. In his sentence pertaining to the riots, the author writes "a 
Quebec pendant la Semaine Sainte de 1918, on eut a deplorer non seulement des scenes 
disgracieuses mais aussi des blesses et des morts." Likewise, Monpays (1954), a 
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textbook by Leon Daigneault, discusses only the Canadian soldiers' battlefield 
experiences and the achievements of the Royal 22" . Histoire du Canada (1954) also 
mainly focuses on the story of the Western front. Although it does allocate a few 
sentences to the riots, it does not explain why they occurred or identify who was 
involved. The textbook's author, Jean Bruschesi writes, "II y eut des morts et des 
blesses." A few years later, Monpays (1956) by Abbots Hermann Plante and Louis 
Martel, as well as L 'Histoire de notre pays (1958) by Alphonse Grypinich, both 
completely ignore the story of the riots. In its fourteen page story of the war, the latter 
textbook explains conscription in a one-sentence reference as an unpopular law in 
Quebec. This is in contrast to the former work which provides a detailed description of 
the conscription crisis, and for the first time in a school textbook, criticizes federal 
government policy towards Quebecers during the war.189 
It was the Martinique born Robert Rumilly, a civil servant with no professional 
training in the discipline, who was the only francophone to write about the Quebec City 
riots before the Quiet Revolution. Although averse to archival research, his forty-one 
volume Histoire de la province de Quebec (1940-1969)190 is still an important 
contribution as it was one of the first large studies of post-Confederation Quebec 
history.191 Similar to Groulx, he believed that French-Canadian culture was being 
threatened by the pre-dominance of Canada's Anglophone majority, as well as by the 
109 
evils of modernity. By taking pride, through history, in the French language and the 
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Catholic religion, Rumilly, like many of his contemporaries including Groulx, believed 
that his people could resist these powerful assaults on their survival.193 Akin to Groulx, 
this historian's writing, which emphasized individuals, concentrated on the stories of 
Quebec's heroes, those who defended the rights of French-Canadians and Catholics, and 
of the villains who threatened them. 
In his section on the riots, which includes no footnotes, Rumilly's imagination 
was captivated by Armand Lavergne. When Lavergne spoke to the crowd on the Easter 
Sunday of the riots, the historian describes him as nothing less than a war hero. He 
writes, "Le colonel Lavergne est en civil, mais on dirait toujours qu'il porte un uniforme, 
un casque, un panache; on l'imagine au temps de la guerre en dentelle, colonel aux 
chevau-legers."194 Alternatively, his portrayal of the Dominion Police and the Canadian 
Army, the two groups he blames for provoking Quebecers to riot, is much more critical. 
In a typically dramatic passage, Rumilly describes conscripts being mistreated by the 
police: 
Si les insoumis echangent quelques mots, en route, les policiers, flairant une 
conspiration, leur enjoignent: "Speak English!" S'ils font un geste de la main, les 
policiers passent les menottes, comme a des voleurs. Des femmes, apeurees, 
sanglotent. Des adolescents, sur le pas des portes, assistent, impuissants, rageurs, 
a ce spectacle. lis le gravent dans leur memoire. 
Similarly, in his story of the army's actions on Easter Sunday, he writes, "les 
officiers anglais donnent des orders severes. 'Quand je commanderai le tir, dit l'un deux, 
il faudra tirer serieusement, tirer pour tuer.'"1 However, his description of April 1st 
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1918, the night the four civilians were killed, was particularly exaggerated. He writes, 
"Une mitrailleuse crepite, puis deux, puis trois. Un homme tombe comme une pierre. Un 
autre tombe le buste en avant, casse en deux. D'autres roulent a terre.. .La neige, 
clemente, commence a les recouvrir."197 A few sentences later, in his 
depiction of the scene after the shooting, Rumilly writes, "Une main sanglante a laisse 
son empreinte sur un mur de la rue, a hauteur d'appui; peut-etre un blesse s'est-il releve 
la." In the end, Rumilly's sensational story of outsiders victimizing innocent 
Quebecers, in many ways foreshadowed the later work of the Universite de Montreal 
academics. 
II A BROKEN PEOPLE 
By the 1950s, the historical profession was firmly entrenched at both the 
Universite de Montreal and the Universite Laval. At the former institution, Guy Fregault, 
Maurice Seguin and Michel Brunet, all historians who had worked under Groulx's 
tutelage, argued that the obstacles Quebecers faced in the post-Second World War period, 
both economically and politically, were due to the Conquest. Unlike Groulx, who 
believed that British rule had allowed Quebecers to accomplish much, the Montreal 
historians believed the legacy of the Conquest, including the founding of the Canadian 
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state, had been an unmitigated disaster for Quebec. More pessimistic than some of 
their predecessors, who often had seen the hand of God guiding Quebecers through the 
rough and tumble of their history, the Montreal historians constructed a secular narrative 
of the past which blamed the "Other" for all their problems. Two hundred years after the 
Conquest, due to the pernicious British rule and the American influence in the province, 
these historians argued that Quebecers were a 'broken people' with nothing to be proud 
of. In a lecture at the University of Toronto, Guy Fregault said, "Here we are with our 
four million people and our illusions." For these academics, the impact of the 
Conquest could only be erased if Quebecers were to achieve more political and economic 
independence. Their new perspective on Quebec's past inspired many of the reforms 
during the Quiet Revolution and encouraged some Quebecers to demand special status, if 
not sovereignty, for the province.202 
In their examination of the past to show the victimization of the French by the 
English, the Montrealers, like their predecessors, wrote mostly about the history of New 
France and the impact of Conquest during the late 18th and 19th centuries. Consequently, 
they did not write about conscription and the Quebec City riots. However, by the late 
1950s and subsequently, their view of the past would start to influence Quebec's amateur 
historians who would come to write on the topic. 
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At the dawn of the Quiet Revolution, Albert Tessier published Quebec-Canada: 
Histoire du Canada (1959)203, a work that marks a pivotal shift in the historiography of 
the riots. It is the first school textbook that does not mention the Royal 22nd battalion or 
any of the battles where the Canadian army fought, including Vimy. Instead, Tessier's 
version of World War I, which incorporates for the first time such stories as the 
Francoeur motion, is entirely that of Quebec, conscription and the riots.204 Similar to the 
Montreal historians, the author portrays the Quebecers of 1918 as victims of the "Other." 
He writes, "Un regiment de Toronto fut envoye a Quebec pour maintenir l'ordre. 
L'inevitable se produisait: une emeute eclata. La troupe fit claquer les mitrailleuses, tuant 
90S 
quatre civils et infligeant des blessures a plusieurs autres." 
By the 1960s some Quebecers still believed that their economic and political 
positions could not improve within the framework of Confederation. The separatists, 
whether violent like the Front de Liberation du Quebec, or democratic like Rene 
Levesque's Parti quebecois, believed, like Groulx , Rumilly and the Montreal academics, 
used history to advance their political cause. It is in this context that one can understand 
the amateur historian Joseph Costisella's popular work Le Peuple de la nuit: histoire des 
Quebecois (1965). 
As in Tessier's account, the soldiers and the battlefields are absent from 
Costisella's version of the war which is centered on conscription and the Quebec City 
riots. The journalist, in virulent language, describes all those who supported the European 
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adventure, which he calls a "crime cooperatif', as a clique of traitors and sellouts. 
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Conversely, the author positively depicts the draft dodgers who hid out in the woods 
during the conscription crisis, as having chosen to die for Quebec rather than for the King 
of England.208 As for the riots, Costisella argues they were just one example, among 
many in the history of Quebec, where the "colonial" federal government abused its power 
in order to subject Quebecers to its rule. Akin to Rumilly's portrayal of the Easter 
Monday violence, in both tone and lack of footnotes, the author writes, "Le lendemain, 
les troupes colonialistes ouvrirent le feu avec les mitrailleuses contre le peuple, pendant 
que les mercenaires de la cavalerie chargeaient sabre au point."209 In more inflammatory 
language, Costisella writes: 
Ce fut une boucherie ecceurante: des femmes, le visage ensanglante, furent 
defigurees pour la vie. Des enfants furent gravement blesses, le sang vermeil de la 
population s'ajouta a tout celui qui avait ete repandu depuis 1760, pour que 
l'Ordre colonialiste regne. II y eut quatre civils de tues, et de tres nombreux 
blesses. Les resistants riposterent en ouvrant le feu sur les troupes colonialistes 
depuis les toits et de derriere les bancs de neige.210 
Similar to that of the Montrealers, the author's view of Quebec's past since the 
Conquest is one of the victimization of Quebecers by outsiders. In this lugubrious history, 
a violent army disfigures innocent women while children are severely beaten. 
Meanwhile, the martyred rioters are entirely free from blame, returning fire only after the 
four civilians were killed. Like Rumilly, and later Provencher, Costisella's morality play 
has bad guys-the colonialists, Borden, the Dominion Police, and the English, opposed by 
good guys-Armand Lavergne, Henri Bourassa, Mayor Lavigueur and Police Chief Emile 
Trudel. The latter two officials, the author believes, tacitly encouraged the rioting.211 
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A few years later, the story of the riots in Histoire 1534-1968 212 (1968), by 
Denis Vaugeois, Jacques Lacoursiere, and Jean Provencher, all amateur historians, 
appears, to have also been influenced by the Montreal academics' interpretation of the 
past. In the preface to a later edition, the authors claimed their work was "serious, 
i n 
objective and balanced." They wrote, "Elle (their history) ne pretend pas apporter une 
nouvelle interpretation de notre histoire, elle tient au contraire a laisser au lecteur la 
liberie de formuler ses propres jugements a partir d'une information aussi complete que 
possible."214 Nevertheless, in this popular school textbook's eight page history of the 
First World War, the battlefield experience is described in two sentences, and there is no 
mention of Vimy or the Royal 22nd battalion. Instead, they include two photographs 
never seen before in a school textbook. The first, referring to the Francoeur motion , is a 
picture of a La Presse newspaper with the title, "Pour faire sortir le Quebec de la 
T I C 
Confederation canadienne." Published in an era when the French President Charles De 
Gaulle uttered his famous words "Vive le Quebec libre", and during which many 
Quebecers were already questioning Quebec's place in Canada, such a headline might 
have had particular relevance to its readers. More related to the riots, the second 
photograph, which takes up an entire page and makes it very clear whom the students 
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should blame for the deaths, reads, "Cinq civils sont tues par les soldats a Quebec." As 
for their written history of the riots, which is sometimes confused, the authors hold the 
Dominion Police and the soldiers responsible for the violence and portray Quebecers as 
victims of the "Other".217 
HI ON AVAIT RAREMENT PARLE AUPARAVANT 
In the autumn of 1970 believing independence from Canada could only be 
achieved by violence, the Front de Liberation du Quebec kidnapped James Cross, a 
British diplomat, and Pierre Laporte, a Quebec cabinet minister. In an effort to crush the 
FLQ movement, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau declared the War Measures Act. Within 
twenty-four hours of the measure being declared, officials arrested hundreds of suspected 
FLQ members, most of whom were never charged. To many in the rest of Canada, the 
murder of Pierre Laporte justified the prime minister's decision to use the War Measures 
Act. However, many Quebecers were unsettled by seeing armed soldiers and tanks 
patrolling the streets of their cities, as well as hearing of the mass unwarranted arrests in 
the middle of the night. Moreover, some were indignant by the actions of a prime 
minister from Quebec who appeared to be selling out his people. To this day, the memory 
of the October Crisis continues to arouse powerful emotions among many Quebecers. 
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Jean Provencher, a young Quebec historian, who had some professional 
training , was greatly affected by the October Crisis. Confronted by the War 
Measures Act of 1970, Provencher began to write his popular history Quebec: sous la loi 
des mesures de guerre 1918. In an interview with Le Soleil, the historian explained his 
motivation for writing his book, "Quand j 'ai entendu des gens d'un certain age, lors des 
evenements d'octobre dernier, dire des choses comme '9a n'a pas de bon sens, on n'a 
jamais vu 9a au Quebec', etc., je n'ai pu m'empecher de rediger mon livre."220 
Provencher's book is divided into three chapters. The first examines the 
conscription crisis and Quebec during the First World War. The second, the longest, 
focuses on the five-day riots from March 28th to April 1st 1918, and the third looks at the 
aftermath of the riots and the coroner's inquest. 
The second chapter "Z,e Soulevement Populaire de Quebec " is the story of the key 
events during the riots, largely based on testimony given during the coroner's inquest. 
Being the first and apparently only historian until the current author to examine the 
inquest, Provencher's chapter is important because he has provided previously 
unpublished information. Influenced by the Montrealers' view of the past, as well as the 
political and social unrest of early 1970s Quebec, Provencher writes with a politically 
charged narrative that depicts Quebecers as victims of the Canadian Army and Federal 
government policy. 
Jean Provencher received his "licence et un diplome d'etudes superieures en histoire de l'universite de 
Laval." For the last forty years, he has been an independent historian and he has produced numerous works 
about Quebec history. 
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In this chapter, Provencher is critical of several key figures who tried to stop the 
rioting. Above all, he is especially tough on General Lessard. For Provencher, Lessard is 
no more than a pawn of the British-federalist imperialists. He perjoratively describes 
Lessard as being well-trained at the game of repressing rebellions and protests.225 
Lessard, the historian points out, had gained experience during the 1878 Quebec City 
workers' strike, the 1885 North-West Rebellion, as well as the Boer War.226 According to 
Provencher, the Major-General's involvement in the Quebec City riots was just one more 
example of his long history of repressing minorities-whether it be workers, the Metis, the 
Boers, or Quebecers. 
In contrast to Provencher's portrayal, some sources offer a quite different 
description of Lessard. For example, in March 1918, La Presse describes the General as 
being well-respected and "l'un des militaires les plus qualifies que nous ayons au 
Canada."227 The same newspaper wrote that Lessard commanded great admiration from 
General Foch and General Kitchener.228 In the House of Commons, Wilfrid Laurier had 
commended Borden's government for sending General Lessard to Quebec City. Laurier 
said, "General Lessard should have been used long ago. If he had been called to service 
in the early months of the war, perhaps there would be no trouble to quell today in the 
990 
city of Quebec." Even Le Devoir, had approved the appointment of Lessard to 
command the troops in Quebec City.230 
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Provencher acknowledges none of this throughout his book. Referring to the 
inquest when Lessard was asked by one of the jurors whether soldiers had been killed or 
injured on Easter Monday, Provencher writes, "Le general lui (the juror) repond que 
quelques soldats ont souffert de blessures et ajoute: "Nous avons au moins une douzaine 
de chevaux qui sont blesses. II y a un cheval qu'on a ete oblige de tuer." Curiously, 
Provencher decided to include the horse quote, which itself was accurate, but omitted the 
General's description of the injured soldiers. In fact it was his recollection of the injured 
soldiers, which Lessard estimated to be about thirty men (more than just a few), that had 
prompted him to make his horse comment. 
In addition, Provencher portrays Lessard as being entirely unreasonable, power 
thirsty, and looking to provoke the rioters to violence. He devotes a considerable amount 
of attention to describing the exchange, on the morning of Easter Monday, between 
Armand Lavergne and General Lessard. In this conversation, portrayed entirely from 
Lavergne's perspective, General Lessard dismisses Lavergne's plea to hold back the 
soldiers and tells the lawyer "J'ai la force et je m'en sers." Lessard comes across as 
being arrogant and close-minded. However, Provencher does not include Lessard's 
testimony which explains his perspective on the matter. With considerable experience 
dealing with rioters, Lessard believed it had been imperative to send out troops to make 
sure the rioters were not able to congregate. At the inquest, he said, "C'est entendu que 
quand une foule s'organise que c'est trop tard pour la disperser. On peut avoir plus de 
gens qui seront tues et blesses."233 In short, according to Lessard, his intention of sending 
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out the soldiers on Easter Monday was in order to avoid, not foment, further bloodshed 
and violence. By placing posters around the city, and by putting warnings in newspapers, 
both at considerable cost to the federal government, Lessard also argued that he had tried 
his best to convince Quebecers to stay home that night. At the inquest, when Lavergne 
criticized Lessard for his actions, the General replied, "Je suis venu pour aider la 
situation, j 'ai cru qu'on comprendrait la chose—simplement pour aider au General 
Landry—pour que vous n'ayez deux Canadiens Francais pour vous aider. J'ai fait mon 
grand possible pour empecher l'effusion du sang." 
Provencher is not much kinder to Brigadier-General Joseph Landry. In his 
description of March 29th, the night the rioters burned the Auditorium, Provencher 
writes, "Landry promet egalement de tirer sur les manifestants immediatement apres la 
lecture de l'Acte d'emeute. Mais le maire l'exhorte a agir avec plus de prudence."235 The 
historian makes this claim based solely on Lavigueur's testimony, ignoring that of 
Landry. According to the Brigadier-General, once the Riot Act was read, he had told the 
Mayor that his troops would wait for Lavigueur's orders before shooting at the rioters. 
Based on the discipline shown by the soldiers the following night, it seems credible that 
Landry did want to avoid violence. Second, Provencher appears to be mistaken to say the 
Mayor encouraged Landry to be more prudent, thus portraying the civilian as more 
compassionate than the soldier. It seems more plausible that Lavigueur was reluctant to 
read the Riot Act because when he and the military arrived at the Auditorium it had 
already been severely damaged. As stated in Chapter 2, if the Mayor, as Landry advised, 
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had fulfilled the legal requirements to authorize military authority much of the violence 
might have been avoided. In any case, once the Mayor arrived late on the scene, he 
decided that reading the Riot Act would not be useful. However, the Mayor's 
unwillingness to read the act was not because he was ethically opposed to firing on the 
rioters. Indeed, in testimony Provencher chose not to include in his book, the Mayor said 
he supported the shooting of rioters in order to protect public property.237 
Provencher's depiction of the military's rank and file is also suspect. When 
describing Easter Monday, he portrays the cavalry as knocking down women and 
children who did not have time to get off the sidewalk. He then writes, "Ces gestes 
brutaux soulevent la fureur populaire et les glacons, les briques et les pierres se mettent a 
pleuvoir sur les soldats."238 The problem here is that there is no evidence, certainly none 
provided by Provencher, that women and children were injured by the horses. 
Furthermore in the description of the soldiers' first round of firing, Provencher writes, "A 
un moment donne, sans avoir lu quelque papier que ce soit, l'officier en charge leur a 
donne l'ordre de tirer. Apres le coup, nous avons entendu une plainte extraordinaire d'un 
homme." Strangely, in his footnote, Provencher credits Major Mitchell for these words 
that portray the soldiers as acting impulsively, when in fact they are the words of the 
witness Wilfred Dion. Conversely, on the same page, in two other footnotes, in testimony 
given by Dion, the historian mistakes him for Mitchell. It is difficult to say whether these 
footnotes merely represent an error in Provencher's methodology, or whether he 
intentionally used Mitchell's name to give increased credibility to a narrative too 
dependent on the eyewitness Dion. 
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Similarly, Provencher misuses Rodgers' testimony in describing the operation of 
the machine gun. After Rodgers testified that he only shot the gun once for 36 rounds, 
Provencher then writes, "Deux nouvelles salves se font entendre. On tire dans les portes 
ou les fenetres de certaines maisons."240 Inexplicably, Provencher attributes this claim of 
multiple firings to Rodgers, a man who had testified the contrary. 
Jean Provencher, like Rumilly and Costisella, is much kinder to Armand 
Lavergne, Emile Trudel, and Henri-Edgar Lavigueur. In Provencher's mind, Lavergne is 
the noblest character in the entire story. The historian appears to view Lavergne as a 
tragic hero: a principled anti-conscriptionist that tried his best to stop the rioting but 
ultimately was betrayed by the federalist forces. However, Provencher does not mention 
that Lavergne, on Easter Sunday, told the crowd that they could do as they wished if the 
federal government did not fulfill their alleged "promises." Lavergne played a dangerous 
game that he hoped would force the government to concede to his demands. However, if 
the demands were not met, as they were not, the lawyer's ultimatum would force a show-
down between rioters, who now had expectations for change, and the army, which was 
sent out to prevent the crowd from assembling at Lavergne's rally. 
Provencher's description of Lavergne's actions on Easter Sunday and Monday is 
almost entirely told from the lawyer's point of view. For example, the historian uses 
Lavergne's testimony to accuse Taschereau and Machin of offering, in gratitude to the 
lawyer for speaking to the crowd, the position of Chief Keeper of Records of the Militia 
Service Act in Ottawa. When Lavergne refused the position, Provencher, in an apparent 
telling revelation of his own political allegiance, writes, "Voyant que Lavergne ne mord 
pas plus rapidement a l'appat federal, les trois hommes reviennent aux problemes 
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immediats." Such suggestive rhetoric portrays Lavergne as faithful to his people and 
suggests that other Quebecers, such as Lessard and Taschereau, somehow sold-out by 
going to work in Ottawa. In any case, Provencher probably should have informed the 
reader that Machin, Taschereau and Robert Borden all vehemently denied offering 
Lavergne such a position. 
Provencher also portrays the Chief of Police Emile Trudel as a man of exemplary 
integrity. In the Good Friday description, the night the Auditorium was attacked, the 
historian defends Trudel and his force for not shooting at the rioters. At the inquest, after 
Major Barclay asked Trudel why he did not protect public property, Provencher recalls 
the Chief of Police's eloquent response, "Parce qu'on peut rebatir une propriete. Vous ne 
pouvez pas rebatir une personne." However, Provencher does not mention Trudel's 
successive failures to defend the building, or his decision to follow the Mayor instead of 
remaining with his officers. More telling still, although he includes a picture with a 
caption that reads "Emile Trudel, chef de police de Quebec.. .11 refusa d'ouvrir le feu sur 
ses compatriots"244, Provencher does not incorporate Trudel's testimony in which the 
Chief admitted he would have shot first at hostile rioters armed with weapons. Neither 
does Provencher mention the testimony of Horace Scott, a city policeman, who claimed 
Trudel phoned him at the police station on the night of Easter Sunday, and ordered his 
men to go and fire on the rioters gathered at the C.P.R. station.246 Trudel, in his second 
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appearance at the inquest, adamantly denied Scott's accusations and argued that someone 
747 
was trying to impersonate him on the phone. 
Similar to his representation of Trudel, Provencher also ignores some of Mayor 
Lavigueur's actions. In his description of the Good Friday riots, the historian admits that 
Landry advised the Mayor to make sure the legal requirements were met for military 
intervention; however, Provencher does not convey the sense of frustration felt by Landry 
and Borden when the Mayor failed to accomplish this task. Without being familiar with 
these perspectives, it is difficult to understand why the prime minister felt it necessary to 
send more troops to Quebec and to give overwhelming powers to the military. In regard 
to, arguably, the most critical day of the riots, when appropriate action by the Mayor 
might have ended the violence, Provencher refuses to criticize Lavigueur's decisions. 
During the inquest, in another pertinent exchange between Barclay and Lavigueur, which 
Provencher does not point out, the Mayor admitted that on the Friday morning, after 
receiving more than 25 phone calls, he was aware that many Quebecers were afraid for 
their lives and property. When Barclay asks the Mayor, "Les citoyens ordinaires de 
Quebec avaient peur pour leurs vies et leurs proprietes pendant ces jours la? ", Lavigueur 
responds by saying, "Oui, plusieurs."248 It is possible Provencher ignored this testimony 
because it shows that some Quebecers feared the actions of the rioters and were worried 
about their own safety and property. This is contrary to the historian's belief that the 
rioters were mostly benevolent, targeting only symbols related to conscription. In 
addition, by including Lavigueur's admission, the Mayor might have been perceived as 
not having taken the appropriate action to protect the citizens of Quebec City. 
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Throughout the book, Provencher chooses the accounts he thinks best supports his 
argument while ignoring those that do not. A good example is the testimony of Dr. 
Marois, the doctor who examined the bodies of the four victims. Provencher accepts 
Marois' argument that the victims were killed by explosive bullets from the rifles of 
Canadian soldiers. In his narrative, the historian describes Alexandre Bussieres as being, 
"atteint aux poumons par les balles explosives des soldats."24 Although Dr. Marois' 
expertise should not be dismissed, the historian does not mention Lafferty's inquest 
testimony in which he argues that such wounds could have been caused by regular 
bullets. Furthermore, in his conclusion, Provencher does acknowledge the April 3rd 
Military inquest250, which took place five days before the Coroner's inquest and which 
determined explosive bullets were not used by the army. However, the historian simply 
rejects the jury's findings for being made too quickly, and doubts the possibility for 
objectivity among the mostly Anglophone jurors. Curiously, the historian is uncritical 
about the potential for bias at the Coroner's Inquest a few days later among the mostly 
Francophone jury. 
Provencher is also reluctant to blame the rioters for the initial shooting on the 
Easter Monday. The historian's only admission is that "des officiers rapportent a Rodgers 
qu'ils sont les victims de tireurs isoles."251 A few paragraphs down, on the same page, the 
historian explains, "On entend certains coups de feu venant de la foule. Mais on ne sait si 
c'est la le bruit de veritables balles ou de balles blanches." By using the word "on", the 
historian is ambiguous in explaining who thought the bullets were not real. Does he mean 
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the crowd? The police? The military? Or him? As there are no footnotes to explain this 
claim, there are also no answers to these questions. 
In any case, at the coroner's inquest, there was significant testimony given, none 
of which Provencher has included in his book, which suggests the rioters were 
responsible for the initial shooting. Xavier Blouin, constable for the city police force, 
estimated that the rioters shot at the soldiers between 25 and 50 times before the troops 
responded.253 Blouin also acknowledged that he had seen at least one soldier injured. 
Isidore Caouette, another constable, testified he had also seen a soldier fall after being 
shot by the rioters. In addition, Caouette, in testimony supported by Constables Landry 
and Boucher, acknowledged that the soldiers did not reply with fire until they began to 
suffer injuries.254 Major Mitchell said two soldiers had been wounded before he went to 
the intersection of Saint-Vallier, Bagot, and Saint-Joseph, and, after he arrived, one 
soldier was shot through the jaw. Mitchell claimed these three injuries all happened 
before the soldiers began shooting.255 Finally, Major Rodgers said his soldiers shot at the 
crowd only after being under considerable fire on Boulevard Langelier as well as at the 
intersection where the victims were killed. 
Quebec: sous la hi des mesures de guerre 1918, with its simple and provocative 
account, thus encourages the reader to develop a sense of anger towards the "outsiders" 
so powerfully identified by the author. It appears the historian wants the story of the riots 
to be viewed as yet another example of Quebecers being victimized by the "Other." For 
Provencher, the federal government's failure to indemnify the families of the four killed 
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only exacerbates Quebecers' continued sense of victimization. At the end of the author's 
work, Leandre Demeule, the older brother of Georges Demeule, explains to Provencher 
that his family never received any money from the federal government. The book ends 
with Demeule bitterly saying, "Absolument rien. Je n'ai jamais entendu parler que qui 
que ce soit ait eu une cent. On n'a rien eu. Pas meme une letter de sympathie. Pas raeme 
un billet de char."257 
This sense of victimization at the hands of the "Other" is also prevalent in 
Provencher's Quebec, Printemps 1918 (1973). On October 11th 1973, the author's play, 
which partially re-created the coroner's inquest, opened in Quebec City's Theatre du 
Trident. It ran for one month, ending symbolically on November 11th, the anniversary of 
the First World War armistice. Later, Provencher and Gilles Lachance, the co-author, 
published the play in book format. 
Similar to Quebec: sous la hi des mesures de guerre 1918, Provencher claims his 
play represents the "truth" about the riots. In the preface, he writes: 
Quebec, Printemps 1918 ou le jeu conscient de l'ambiguite est un document 
authentique. Tous les personnages ont existe et sont designes sous leur nom 
veritable. Leur temoignage correspond aux notes stenographies de l'enquete du 
coroner tenue a Quebec, du 8 au 13 avril 1918. 
Nous aurions pu etre tentes de dramatiser les evenements, de modifier les 
caracteres et d'orienter agreablement Taction. Nous avons prefere nous eloigner 
de Pallegorie pour cerner davantage la realite. 
Despite Provencher's faith in being able to find the "truth" in the past, a creed in 
which his contemporaries at the academic institutions believed, his play is far from a 
"document authentique" because many of the witnesses who testified at the inquest are 
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not part of his account. For example, Provencher does not include Lafferty, Blouin, Scott, 
Mitchell or Landry. The omission of the latter two in particular is significant considering 
that both officers spent a great amount of time testifying. Instead, the historian's play is 
focused on characters like Wilfred Dion and Armand Lavergne, even though the actual 
inquest ended with testimony given by Mitchell, Choquette, and Scott. The emphasis on 
Dion, the one and only witness who remembered the soldiers shooting first at the rioters 
is questionable, because much of his testimony at the actual inquest was relatively short 
and was contradicted by other witnesses who are not cast in the historian's play. It 
appears that by ending the play with Lavergne's story, Provencher hoped to leave the 
audience angered by the story of a Quebecer, with noble intent, betrayed by federalist 
forces. 
Although Provencher says the testimony given by the witnesses is authentic to the 
original inquest document, the reality is that the historian has put his own words into 
various characters' mouths. For example, when explaining his role in operating the 
machine gun, Provencher's Major Rodgers says, "J'ai tire avec la mitrailleuse sur les 
murs, trois fois."259 This claim is false for at the inquest, Rodgers acknowledged that he 
shot the machine gun once for only a few seconds. However, by making Rodgers shoot 
the gun three times, Wilfred Dion, the only witness to say the gun was fired more than 
twice, becomes more credible, ultimately strengthening Provencher's argument. 
Furthermore, reflecting the impact of the October Crisis on the author, Provencher has 
Rodgers, and several others, use the term "loi des mesures de guerre" or in Rodger's case 
"War Measures Act", a term they never used in the original document. Lastly, 
Rodgers testimony, 47. 
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Provencher's Rodgers comes across as lacking confidence, repeating himself, and 
struggling to speak in French. At the actual inquest, Rodgers appears confident, 
competent, and only gives his testimony in English. 
When first published, Quebec: sous la hi des mesures de guerre 1918 was 
promoted as the story Quebecers should have been taught but never were. Provencher, 
possibly with his own interests in mind, encouraged the idea that it was tragic that 
Quebecers had forgotten this important story. At the beginning of both book and play, the 
historian includes the poignant quote from Charles G. Power, a former Quebec member 
of parliament, who said: 
II est difficile de comprendre que le sort d'un homme, Louis Riel, execute a plus 
de mille milles de Quebec, ait pu remuer tout un peuple jusqu'au plus profond de 
son etre collectif pendant trois generations, alors que ce meme peuple a passe sous 
silence et relegue dans 1'oubli, en l'espace de quelques semaines, ce qui 
constituait, dans son esprit tout au moins, le massacre de quatre citoyens 
innocents au coeur meme de la province. 
Provencher's two works both honoured the four who were killed and 
commemorated those Quebecers who chose to fight for, what the author deemed, a just 
cause. Furthermore, the works were meant to correct the perceived historical injustice of 
an event that seemed to have been forgotten. In a Radio-Canada interview, Provencher 
said "On avait rarement parle auparavant (before he wrote the book) et dans aucun 
manuel scolaire on en avait fait mention, c'est pour 9a justement j 'ai fait le bouqin." 
Although he ignored the work of some of his predecessors, it is true that Provencher's 
work revived a story which historians appeared to have largely forgotten. At the time, 
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judging by his work's reception, it seems some believed the resuscitation of the story was 
a worthy cause. Fernand Dumont, in the preface to Provencher's book, expressed the debt 
Quebecers owed the young historian, when he wrote, "Que Ton n'en parle plus? On sera 
reconnaissant a Jean Provencher d'en reparler."263 Le Soleil, a few weeks before the play 
opened, praised Provencher's work for informing Quebecers about this tragic story.264 On 
opening night, the same newspaper explained that the historian's play would bring justice 
to the names of the forgotten victims. The day after the first performance, the paper 
remarked that an opening narration to situate the characters in historical context was 
needed for an audience which until now was "contente des insuffisances historiques de 
nos livres de classe."266 According to Dumont, Quebecers now had a duty to remember 
this episode in Quebec's history. He eloquently wrote, "Les peuples non plus ne doivent 
pas accepter que Ton relegue a l'oubli les temoignages anciens de leur servitude."2 7 
Some took heed of Dumont's words. Since Provencher published his work, at least 
among Quebec's amateur historical community, the story of the Quebec City riots has 
been frequently represented in texts, documentaries, and public commemoration. 
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4 
Blaming the "Other": The Quebec City Riots and the 
Narrative of Victimization 
In early September 1998 approximately one hundred people, both young and old, 
attended the unveiling of the monument Quebec, Printemps 1918 in Quebec's City's 
Lower Town. In the same year that thousands of people around the world commemorated 
the 80th anniversary of the First World War's end, these Quebecers gathered to 
remember a different story. According to a communique released to the press by the 
monument's committee, Quebecers were supposedly remembering the "80e anniversaire 
de ces manifestations populaires et democratiques en protestation contre les methodes 
utilisees par les recruteurs, suite a la mobilisation generale." 
Sitting on a make-shift stage that flew a large Quebec flag, were several 
dignitaries- the Parti quebecois's Andre Gaulin; the Mayor of Quebec City, Jean-Paul 
L'Allier; the President of the Societe Saint-Jean Baptiste, J-Leopold Gagner; a 
descendant of one of the four victims; several members of the monument's committee, 
including its President Louis Belanger; and the historian Jean Provencher. Although 
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Belanger, more than anyone, was responsible for building the monument, Provencher's 
work had ultimately inspired this public remembrance. 
The monument Quebec, Printemps 1918 is one of several representations of the 
riots over the past thirty years to reflect Jean Provencher's work. This chapter will 
examine three different forms of representations: written texts, film, and public 
commemoration. It will show that in all the forms, the story of the Quebec City riots has 
changed very little since Provencher. That story has continued to be told through a 
narrative of victimization that often demonizes Lessard and his soldiers, and over-
dramatizes the role of the machine guns. 
I LES SOLD ATS ONT TIRE SUR LE MONDE (TEXTS) 
By the 1970s, a group of Francophone academics had emerged who had a very 
different view of Quebec's past than the Universite de Montreal academics. Among the 
latter, historians such as Paul-Andre Linteau, Jean-Claude Robert, Jacques Rouillard, and 
Normand Seguin, who were mostly born in the 1940s and who had benefited from the 
gains of the Quiet Revolution, argued that Quebec had developed in a "normal" pattern 
much like other Western nations. By examining the role that material forces played in 
affecting immigration, secularization, and urbanization, these historians refuted the 
discourse of difference championed by their predecessors, instead finding commonalities 
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in the past among Quebecers and other groups. Consequently, over the last thirty years, 
it is perhaps no surprise that these academics have spent little time considering issues 
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such as conscription and the Quebec City riots. With the professional historians (those 
with PhDs) consumed by other topics in Quebec's history, the story of the riots remained 
in the hands of Quebec's amateur historical community.272 
One of the amateurs, the journalist Gerald Filteau, was one of the first Quebecers 
to write a book on the topic of Quebec and the First World War. Le Quebec, le Canada et 
la guerre 1914-1918(1911), like Provencher's earlier work, vilifies General Lessard in 
telling its story of the riots. The General is described as being a French Canadian who 
was completely "assimile." According to this book, it was Lessard and his army which 
were responsible for infuriating ordinary Quebecers and ultimately for killing the four 
victims. Similarly, in the multivolume Le memorial du Quebec (1979), edited by Eliane 
Catela de Bordes, Lessard is again described in unflattering terms. In a ten-page chapter 
on the riots, the author, Clement Fluet, describes Lessard as: 
le dur des durs. Natif de Quebec, il s'est montre brutal envers les grevistes qui 
refusaient de construire le parlement de Quebec en 1878 et cruel a l'egard de ses 
demi-freres, les Metis du Manitoba, lors de la rebellion de 1885. Ottawa compte 
sur lui pour mater les emeutiers. Le gouvernement federal a bien choisi son 
homme.274 
In Paul-Andre Linteau, Jean-Claude Robert, and Rene Durocher's influential work Histoire du Quebec 
contemporain (Volume I (1979), Volume II (1986)) there is one paragraph dedicated to conscription but 
nothing on the riots. See Paul-Andre Linteau et, al Histoire du Quebec contemporain: de la Confederation 
a la crise( 1867-1929) (Montreal: Boreal, 1986), 404. 
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A few pages later, after explaining that the military had shot illegal soft-nosed 
97S 97A 
bullets at the rioters , Lessard is portrayed as a vendu when the author writes, "Un 
Canadien, Quebecois de naissance, aurait permis l'emploi de ce genre de balles contre 
ces citoyens?" In Normand Lester's popular work Le livre noir du Canada anglais 
(2001)278, which the former PQ Premier of Quebec, Bernard Landry, praised as being a 
97Q 980 
'must-read' , Lessard is once again demonized. Citing Provencher's work , Lester 
explains-contrary to the facts- that the General illegally proclaimed martial law without 
asking for authorization from the Mayor or from the Premier of Quebec.281 Consequently, 
Lester argues, Lessard was then able to use his repressive powers in order to shoot at the 
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unarmed crowd with his machine guns. This leads the author to speculate sarcastically 
why there has not been a heritage minute283 produced to tell the story of Lessard's actions 
in Quebec City. To emphasize his point, Lester writes, "Ce moment de grandeur dans 
l'histoire des Forces armees canadiennes est largement oublie." 
Just as Lessard has been condemned by writers in the post-Provencher 
historiography, the Anglophone soldiers have likewise been negatively portrayed. In his 
description of the Anglophone soldiers' arrival in Quebec City, Filteau writes, "la 275
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population deviant furieuse et meme les gens les plus pacifiques rageaient 
inteneurement." Le memorial du Quebec describes soldiers who knocked down 
women and children on the Easter Monday night. The author writes, "Que reste-t-il de 
ces cinq jours de rebellion? Quatre morts, un nombre inconnu de blesses et des souvenirs 
amers: un militaire ordonnant a ses soldats de 'tirer pour tuer' sur ses freres de sang et 
des soldats racistes qui ont ose crier: 'Venez done, enfants de chiennes de Francais, nous 
allons vous decoudre'." The textbook Le Canada dans le Contexte Nord-Americain 
(1984) written by Rodolphe Chartrand et al., also describes soldiers from Toronto 
attacking the crowd "a la bai'onnette" on the Easter Sunday.287 According to Chartrand 
and his contributors, these attacks sparked the rioters to shoot and injure soldiers on the 
Easter Monday. Notre Histoire (1984), written by Danielle Dion-McKinnon et al., 
incorporates an alleged eye witness account of the shootings on the Easter Monday. In 
the passage titled "Les Anglais tirent sur le monde," Rosaire Dion (the eye witness) 
describes the "Toronto" soldiers as a "gang" which simply did not like the Quebecers. In 
his last sentence, Rosaire Dion says, "Je ne sais pas au juste comment 9a (the riots) a 
commence, mais les soldats ont tire sur le monde et il y a eu quatre morts. Un affaire 'de 
meme', on n'oublie jamais 9a."289 
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Likewise, in Nouvelle France-Canada Quebec(l9S6), Claude Bouchard and 
Robert Lagasse write, "L'opinion populaire au Quebec condamne les dirigeants de 
1'Armee qui ont fait preuve d'une hate intempestive a utiliser les armes contre les 
Quebecois."290 Along similar lines, Jacques Lacoursiere's Histoire Populaire du Quebec 
(1997) explains that the soldiers shot at the crowd after the rioters threw ice and 
snowballs at the troops. He describes the riots as a "emeute meurtriere." Still others 
agreed. Histoire du Quebec: Une Societe Nord Americaine (1998), a work by Yves 
Bourdon and Jean Lamarre, explains that the soldiers shot at the crowd on the Easter 
Friday when some Quebecers were 'protesting' in front of the military registry office. 
In Le livre noir du Canada anglais(200\), evoking the Conquest, Lester writes: 
On peut imaginer sans peine l'effet que font ces soldats anglais de Toronto sur les 
Canadiens francais. Pour la premiere fois depuis 1759, une armee anglaise en 
tenue de combat occupe Quebec, des Dragons patrouillent a cheval. La tension 
monte. Les militaires ontariens, unilingues comme il se doit, se comportent en 
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conquerants. 
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For Lester, the soldiers perceived the Quebecers as an enemy comparable to the 
Germans.295 However, he argues that in many ways the soldiers' hatred for the Quebecers 
was more profound than for the Germans, because the former were perceived as traitors 
to the national cause. The injustice of the soldiers' treachery, for Lester, as for 
Provencher, continues to this day because the four victims' families have still not been 
compensated. Lester writes, "Les parents des quatre civils quebecois abattus par l'armee, 
dans des conditions extra-legales, n'obtiendront jamais justice ni aucune compensation. 
Apres tout, ce n'etaient que des Canadiens francais, et ils payaient pour tous les autres 
qui en auraient merite autant."297 
In the post-Provencher historiography, the narrative of victimization has been 
further reinforced by the often sensational description of the machine guns. Le memorial 
du Quebec{\979) argues that the soldiers shot first at the rioters with machine guns full of 
"les balles federales," and which killed at least one of the victims. In Nouvelle France-
Canada Quebec(1986), the authors write, "le gouvernement federate fait intervenir 
l'armee qui ouvre le feu sur la foule avec des mitrailleuses; quatres civils sont tues et un 
grand nombre sont blesses." Le Canada: une histoire populaire de la confederation a 
nos jours300 (2001), Don Gillmore and Pierre Turgeon's book that was written in both 
official languages, explains that on the Easter Monday some rioters threw stones at the 
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soldiers which caused the troops to reply with machine guns. Citing words from a letter 
written by Frank Scott, a military chaplain, the authors write, "Soudain, nous avons 
entendu le feu de plusieurs mitrailleuses. Le bruit etait assourdissant et donnait 
l'impression qu'un massacre se deroulait en bas de la falaise."301 For his part, Normand 
Lester explains that the most blatant manifestation of the soldiers' hatred for the 
Quebecers was when the troops opened fire on the crowd with the heavy machine gun. 
He writes, "C'est a la mitrailleuse lourde que les Ontariens vont se venger.. ..Bilan : 
quelque soixante-quinze victimes civiles, dont quatre hommes fauches par une rafale de 
mitrailleuse."303 
II IL A ETE CRUCIFIE SUR LA TERRE DETROMPEE (FILM) 
In Jocelyn Letourneau's A History for the Future: Rewriting Memory and Identity 
in Quebec, there is an interesting exchange between two filmmakers concerned with how 
best to tell the story of the Conquest. Phillipe Falardeau, an assistant to the 
documentarian Jacques Godbout, argues that filmmakers need to be diligent researchers 
who study all the facts, consult numerous historians and offer multiple perspectives of the 
event. Conversely, the screenplay writer Rene-Daniel Dubois argues that such rigorous 
methodology will result in a story much too complex for a general audience.304 
According to Dubois, the past can only be understood through simple and dramatic 
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narrative. In the end, he goes off to Hollywood to make his film, while Falardeau quits 
the project after Godbout and he are unable to create a satisfactory and objective narrative 
of the past. Over the last twenty years in Quebec, as in much of the Western world, 
films, similar to the one Dubois proposes, have become increasingly popular among 
general audiences who often find scholarly work inaccessible. The large viewership of 
the CBC/Radio-Canada television documentary Canada: A People's History/Canada: 
une histoire populaire (2000/2001) is one example of this phenomenon. 7 
Like texts, documentaries are subjective representations of historical reality. This 
seems obvious, but documentaries for a long time have held a certain trust by the public 
and have often been perceived as being able to convey authenticity. Bill Nichols 
explains why: 
First, documentaries offer us a likeness or depiction of the world that bears a 
recognizable familiarity. Through the capacity of film, and audio tape, to record 
situations and events with considerable fidelity, we see in documentaries people, 
places, and things that we might also see for ourselves, outside the cinema. This 
quality alone often provides a basis for belief: we see what was there before the 
camera; it must be true.309 
Though documentarians often pursue the goal of "truth" in their work, which is a 
worthwhile endeavour, most would admit that it can never actually be achieved. After all, 
the documentary's purpose, like other media, is to tell a story. Alan Rosenthal argues 
that the narrative is the most important part of a historical documentary. He writes 
"telling stories is what film does best; it deals with conceptual and abstract thought only 
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with difficulty."31 In order to tell its story, as well as to capture the attention of a general 
audience, the documentarian might use narration, witnesses, re-enactment, background 
music, and other effects. However, the documentarian is not just a '"fly on the wall', 
letting reality just 'happen' in front of the camera." The documentarian makes choices 
and what he or she decides to shoot and how they shoot it will inevitably be subjective.312 
Since Provencher, there have been three films produced on the First World War 
which have told the story of the Quebec City riots- all through an uncomplicated and 
dramatic narrative of victimization which demonizes General Lessard and the soldiers, 
and sensationalizes the use of the machine guns. Richard Boutet's La guerre oubliee313 
(1987) is the most sensational of the three. This docu-drama examines the experience of 
Quebecers during the First World War, but it largely focuses on conscription and the 
riots. In order to tell its anti-war, anti-federal government, and anti-Anglophone story, it 
presents both real historical figures and fictitious ones. In addition, there are elderly 
witnesses, some of whom are real veterans, who tell their own stories about certain events 
that occurred during the war. Furthermore, Joe Bocan, a well known Quebecoise singer, 
plays the on-screen role of narrator and sings numerous period songs throughout the 
movie. 
Like many of the texts in the post-Provencher period, La guerre oubliee's 
portrayal of General Lessard is highly pejorative. Standing inside a Catholic Church, 
Bocan introduces Lessard. She says, "Le Lundi Rouge. Sur l'ordre de Sieur Borden une 
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troupe bien arme de 1,080 soldats Anglophones commande par General Lessard, un 
francophone, occupe la ville de Quebec.. .c'est l'etat de siege."314 In the next scene, 
Bocan plays a maid who is working in Lessard's Chateau Frontenac office where she 
watches Lessard's meeting with Mayor Lavigueur. After showing Bocan, the camera 
moves to a stern and authoritarian looking Lessard, played by the actor Jacques Godin, 
who is sitting at his desk. In silence, Lessard gets up slowly and walks over to the Mayor 
who is standing at the door. In a meek and nervous manner, the Mayor hands Lessard the 
keys to the city. When the keys are transferred from the civilian to the soldier, the viewer 
hears a loud and menacing military drum. With key in hand, Lessard walks back to his 
desk, puts it down, and picks up a local newspaper. Nothing is said. He returns to 
Lavigueur and with the head of his walking stick dramatically hits the newspaper which 
reads, "Le maire n'arrive plus a controller la situation." Lavigueur looks dejected. 
Finally, Lessard breaks the silence. While circling Lavigueur, who stands obediently at 
attention, Lessard says, "Monsieur vous n'avez pu controler la situation avec votre police 
municipal. Je prends les moyens pour maitriser la chose le plus tot possible. Nous allons 
tirer et nous allons faire des prisonniers. C'est la loi des mesures de guerre." Lessard 
returns to his desk where he turns and throws up his arms when he sees that Lavigueur 
has not left. The Mayor, by now sweating profusely, nervously finishes his drink and 
wipes the sweat off his brow. With ominous music in the background playing, he leaves. 
After Lavigueur has departed, the General and his assistant, angrily turn to the maid 
(Bocan) who realizes she has been caught eavesdropping. She glances away from the two 
men and continues her cleaning. 
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In order to convey its narrative of victimization, this scene, like others in the film, 
mixes elements of fiction and fact. It is true that on the Easter Monday, the Mayor, who 
was concerned about future violence in his city, met with Lessard at the Chateau 
Frontenac. It is also true that, at the inquest, Lavigueur claimed that Lessard said "Nous 
allons tirer et nous allons faire des prisoniers."316 But, just as in Provencher's work, 
Boutet ignores Lessard's inquest testimony which makes the General's actions appear 
much more reasonable. Moreover, the filmmaker's penchant for fabricating is seen at the 
moment when the Mayor hands over the key to the General; an event that was never 
i n 
alluded to by either man. Equally unauthentic is the film's depiction of the exchange 
between the two men; Lavigueur was not made to stand obediently in silence but instead 
was able to voice his concerns to Lessard. As in Provencher's play, Lessard uses the 
charged words "la loi des mesures de guerre" which likely would get an emotional rise 
out of the film's viewers, but which were never used at the coroner's inquest. Lastly, and 
even more telling, there is no evidence that there was a maid in the room who overheard 
Lessard's conversation with the Mayor. Yet, Boutet needed her presence as a way of 
showing how the General was all too conscious of the severity of his words to Lavigueur. 
Bocan, as maid, returns in two later scenes. In the first, she explains that the 
Prime Minister has phoned Lessard to make sure that "tout soit en ordre." Then the 
viewer once again sees Lessard in his office speaking to Borden on the phone. He says, 
"Yes, Mr. Prime Minister. Yes. No...No. Yes, sir. Yes, for the King and the Country sir." 
When he hangs up, Lessard looks somewhat troubled by the conversation. What did 
316
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Borden tell him? Is the filmmaker implying that Borden gave Lessard direct orders to 
shoot at Quebecers? Regardless of the answers, the scene works to depict Lessard as an 
obsequious subject of the Federal government and a pawn for the British imperialists. 
In the second scene, set after the Easter Monday night shooting, the maid is once 
again listening to Lessard on the telephone. He is now speaking to a journalist. Lessard 
says, "Non monsieur, je n'ai pas donne 1'instruction de tirer. J'ai simplement dit aux 
soldats qu'ils sont obliges a se defendre....qu'ils pouvaient disperser la foule." While 
the journalist is presumably speaking, Lessard tells his assistant to put a record on in the 
background. This order makes the General look heartless considering the topic being 
discussed. He then says to the journalist, "Non, aucun soldat mort. Mais nous avons une 
douzaine de chevaux qui ont ete blesses, et meme un cheval qu'on a ete oblige de 
tuer."320 When the conversation ends, Lessard once again catches the maid listening to 
the conversation. This time she drops a tea cup and backs away from him in horror. 
The film's treatment of the ordinary soldiers is equally negative. For example, 
there are three very odd scenes which have Bocan in a church being confronted by the 
soldiers. In the first, the soldiers appear to be running at her but then after she falls to the 
ground, they ignore her and keep running. The second shows five soldiers slowly 
approaching Bocan with their guns pointing at her. Eventually, she is cornered. The 
camera jumps back and forth between a terrified Bocan, and a close-up of a gun barrel 
and the blade of a bayonet. In the third, the viewer only sees the scared face of Bocan in 
the same cornered position where she eventually screams in reaction to some sort of 
319
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action taken by the soldiers. It is not clear why the soldiers are chasing Bocan, nor why 
they approach her with their guns. Even more peculiar is the scene where she screams, 
thus implying the soldiers were assaulting her.321 
Similar to the church scenes, the soldiers are also portrayed as being cruel and 
violent in the depiction of the Easter Monday shootings. After Lessard gives the orders to 
"Charge", the soldiers are seen riding their horses and running on foot towards the 
people. Concurrently, in the background Joe Bocan sings a song with such lyrics as, 
TOO 
"Tirer soldat Canadien. Tirer sans pitie et sans quartier..." When the song is over, shot 
from above, we see several soldiers placing a machine gun down on the street. Once the 
gun is ready, a soldier begins shooting (numerous rounds of bullets) into the crowd. The 
result of the shooting is four dead bodies on the ground. Then, in perhaps the most 
dramatic scene of the movie, Bocan sings an ode to the four who were killed. In the fog, 
wearing a white dress, apparently blood-stained, she walks to each victim to sing their 
story. As she arrives at Demeule's corpse, a soldier kicks the body and then runs away. In 
song, Bocan comments on the boy's youth, and sings, "il a ete crucifie sur la terre 
detrompee." She then walks over to the builder Bergeron and sings, "il ne fera plus de 
maison.. .une balle l'a frappe au front." When Bocan sings to the fallen Tremblay, the 
next body, the viewer sees an elated soldier stealing Bergeron's personal belongings in 
the background. Eventually, she arrives at Buissieres and she poignantly sings, "il pensait 
surement revoir son bebe lui dire bonsoir." At the same time, a soldier steals the personal 
321
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belongings of Tremblay. Finally, walking by a crying woman, Bocan sings about how the 
women in these mens' lives will be profoundly affected by the tragedy of their deaths. 
In Boutet's version of the riots, the narrative of victimization is constructed not 
only through the dramatized scenes but also through witness testimony. Before 
proceeding, however, a word of caution is necessary. In "Rules of Engagement: Public 
History and the Drama of Legitimation," the historian Graham Carr, explains that there is 
a popular perception that experience is 'the most authentic truth.'324 In his discussion of 
the controversy surrounding the CBC documentary The Valour and the Horror, Carr 
explains that many Canadian Second World War veterans were upset with the 
documentarians' narrative which they claimed was "untrue." One veteran, who was 
testifying in front of a Senate committee, exclaimed, "I was there. I went through it. I 
know."325 However, Carr remarks, '"what counts as experience is neither self-evident 
nor straightforward'" because experience is 'always already an interpretation and 
something that needs to be interpreted.'" 
Like the veterans, Boutet's non-actor witnesses do not provide "uncontestable" 
evidence, but rather an interpretation that needs to be critiqued. In La Guerre Oubliee's 
story of the riots, the witness testimony is largely given by one man, who will be 
described as Witness #1. None of the witnesses is identified by name. More troubling, no 
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might have been in 1918. Furthermore, in some cases, they describe their remembered 
experience of a particular moment during the riots but more often they comment on 
certain events which they appear not to have witnessed. This is problematic because as 
"witnesses", their testimony is supposed to describe what they saw rather than what they 
think they know. 
The witness testimony naturally strengthens the narrative. In his description of 
the Easter Thursday skirmish, Witness #1 explains that the Dominion Police ripped up 
the exemption papers of two young men and then arrested them at the Salle Frontenac. 
In his portrayal of Easter Friday, he claims that the mostly French-Canadian soldiers, 
under the command of Landry, refused to shoot at the mob when they attacked the 
Auditorium building.329 He says that Lavigueur signed the Riot Act at the Military Drill 
Hall instead of in the Lower Town, on the Easter Monday. He believes this was a big 
reason for the tragic deaths. He explains, "C'est la qui etait le trouble, parce que personne 
ne savait que Facte d'emeute a ete lu." Describing the same day, Witness #3 (the third to 
speak in front of the camera) argues that the shootings occurred in the late afternoon after 
thousands of people had finished their working day at the shoe factories. He says, "ils 
(the Quebecers) pensaient pas de rencontrer des soldats la. Quands ils ont vu les soldats, 
le rage Font pris les autres. Les autres n'ont pas d'armes pour dire pour se defendre." He 
then says that the crowd began throwing bricks at the soldiers' heads. Lastly, in the only 
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moment where it is clear that the person actually watched the event, Witness #1 
graphically-if very questionably- describes Demeule's death. He says: 
L'armee a tire. On s'en allait a quatre pattes par terre. Le petit Demeule est parti. 
C'est en traversant l'autre bord de la rue qu'il s'est fait poigner par les balles. 
Quand on est arrive le lendemain matin il y avait encore un gros paque de chair 
apres la cloture ou le petit Demeule avait ete pince.330 
Unlike la Guerre oubliee which has actors and witnesses to tell its story, Les 30 
journees qui ontfait le Quebec (2000) uses interviews mostly with academics, but also 
with other historians such as Provencher, as well as voiceover narration for its description 
of the riots. This multi-episode documentary series, directed by Jean Roy, tells the 
stories of the thirty supposedly most important days in Quebec history. Provencher, who 
acted as consultant for the project, is interviewed at length in La loi de conscription-24 
Juillet 191?\331 He, and the others interviewed, give authority to the narrative because of 
their credentials as historians. Indeed, the general public's perception, as Carr writes, is 
often that "experts are sure about what they say, and that anyone in their position would 
agree with them." Nevertheless, historians, like eyewitnesses, provide an interpretation 
of history which can be problematic. "By couching their authority in the language of 
Ibid. Although the description of the shooting makes for dramatic viewing, one does have to wonder 
about its authenticity considering so much of the witness' history appears to be flawed. Moreover, none of 
the period newspapers or any of the people who testified at the coroner's inquest described Demeule's 
death in such a ghastly manner. 
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empiricism and objectivity", Carr states, "historians manage(d) to 'conceal' their 
'intervention' in the narrative by conjuring a view of history devoid of any politics other 
than the 'ideology of realism.'"333 In this documentary, Provencher, the only historian to 
comment on the history of the riots, is an active agent in the construction of the 
victimization narrative. 
Provencher, as in his book, romanticizes the rioters as well as Trudel, Lavigueur, 
and Armand Lavergne, whom he compares to Rene Levesque. On camera, he is 
genuinely excited about the rioters' actions and puts the entire blame for the violence on 
the military authorities. In the documentary, he is even harder on Lessard than in his 
book, describing the officer as a man who "a gagne sa vie comme represseur" and "a rue 
sur les Africains." For two weeks after the Easter Monday violence, the historian claims 
that Lessard did not consult the Mayor of the city or the Premier of the province, but 
instead abused his powers and ruled like "un roi de la ville." With somber music playing 
in the background, the video associates these days with cruel repression.334 
Unlike his book, in which Provencher admitted that the rioters threw projectiles 
at the soldiers, the documentary does not mention that the rioters played any aggravating 
role. In his description of the encounter between the soldiers and the rioters at the pivotal 
intersection, the historian says, "II y a du monde sur Bagot, il y a du monde sur Saint-
Vallier.. .il y a George Gooderham Mitchell qui dit 'hey! on installe la mitrailleuse'. Non 
seulement ils ont decide de tirer des cents de carabines ensemble, mais de tirer la 
mitrailleuse!" At the same time that Provencher provides his commentary in a voice-
333




 According to the testimony at the inquest, it was Major Rodgers who made the decision to use the 
machine gun. See Chapter 2. 
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over, the documentary shows dramatic period footage, which does not appear to have 
been filmed on the Easter Monday, showing the soldiers shooting at a crowd with both 
rifles and machine guns. 
Provencher, as in his previous works, argues that the Quebec City rioters were 
victims of a great injustice, one which continues to this day because of the federal 
government's failure to provide indemnities to the victims' families. He poignantly says 
"ce que je trouve epouvantable a propos de cette histoire..c'est que ces gens la ont ete 
tues dans leurs quartiers, par la guerre, par les soldats, pour etre oppose a la guerre. C'est 
tout a fait absurde." Appropriate to his narrative, the episode ends with the credits 
rolling over the pictures of the four victims, ending with Georges Demeule. The very last 
T O O 
picture seen is one of a soldier shooting a machine gun. 
The machine gun is also central to Jacqueline Corkery's version of the Quebec 
City riots in the documentary series Canada: A People's History/Canada: Une histoire 
populaire (2000/2001).339 In the segment about conscription titled "Une promesse non 
tenue" ("Broken Promises" in English), the story of the riots which is approximately two 
and a half minutes long is told by an off-screen narrator as well as by historical re-
enactment. Corkery's history, like Boutet's and Provencher's, depicts Quebecers as 
victimized by the "Other". The documentary explains that on the Easter Thursday, Joseph 
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"Une promesse non tenue." In Le Canada: une histoire populaire de la confederation a nos jours. 
DVD. Directed by Hubert Gendron and Gordon Henderson. Montreal: Societe Radio-Canada, 
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Mercier was arrested by the Dominion Police force for not having his exemption papers 
thus inciting the anger of many Quebecers. Without acknowledging the distinction 
between the nights of Easter Thursday and Easter Friday, Corkery portrays Mercier's 
arrest as having inspired the rioters to storm the Auditorium building, to burn the 
Registrar's records, and to vandalize the offices of the "government run" Chronicle and 
L 'Evenement.340 In this version, there is no mention of the rioters vandalizing the Police 
Station #3, or the pillaging of hardware stores for weapons, nor the attacks on the 
Dominion Police officers, Evanturel and Belanger. 
Also misleading is the documentary's portrayal of the soldiers' participation in 
the conflict. It does not describe the Army's early involvement under Landry's command 
but instead claims that soldiers from Ontario and the West intervened after four days of 
rioting. With the Easter Monday shootings being the next story told, this omission is 
important because it gives the impression that the soldiers arrived in Quebec City and 
immediately began shooting at the crowd. In this context, the Easter Monday shootings 
are powerfully described by means of a real letter written by a woman named Amy Scott. 
With machine guns shooting in the background, an actress playing Scott recites the letter 
she is writing to her husband, "Tu ne peux pas savoir comment on se sent quand on 
entendent le crepitement des mitraillettes, les hurlements de la foule enragee et quand tu 
pense que tout pres de nous il y a des combats et un pan de sang."341 Without explaining 
why the soldiers shot at the rioters, the narrator says, "Une douzaine de citoyens sont 
blesses.. .quatre autres sans amies sont tues." There is no mention of the soldiers being 
340
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Ibid. In Gillmore and Turgeon's textbook, instead of using Amy Scott's letter to describe the violence, 
the authors quote her son who appeared to be listening to the shooting from the Upper-Town. See this 
Chapter's section on texts. 
attacked or any resulting injuries to the troops. With somber music playing, the 
documentary shows the newspaper obituaries of the four victims ending with Demeule. 
Each victim's occupation and age is described, and in Bergeron's case, the narrator 
poignantly explains that he had six children.342 In the final scene the camera pans towards 
a coffin covered with white roses. This coffin presumably is Demeule's. We then hear a 
sensational account of the Demeule shooting while sad music is playing in the 
background. This graphic account is identical to Witness #1 's in La Guerre Oubliee343 
III C'EST PEU CONTESTABLE (PUBLIC COMMEMORATION) 
In her book Martyred Village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-
sur-Glane, Sarah Farmer examines French public remembrance of the killing of hundreds 
of innocents by the Nazis. She writes: 
Commemoration reveals much about a society's relationship to its past because it 
mediates between individual testimony and collective remembrance; between the 
often conflicting perspectives of participating groups (survivors, the families of 
those touched by the events being memorialized, associations, government 
authorities, political parties); between past, present and future; between 
remembered experience and the written works of professional historians; between 
remembering and forgetting.3 4 
Unlike the documentary, the book's authors explain bluntly that the result of the shooting was, "Bilan 
officiel: 4 morts et plus de 70 blesses." The book also ignores the stories of the four victims and does not 
include the documentary's sensational account of the Demeule death. See Gillmore and Turgeon, 116. 
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The public commemoration of the Quebec City riots, as was the case at Oradour-
sur-Glane, has also reflected many of the elements that Farmer identifies. Nevertheless, 
unlike the French village, which government officials deemed worthy of memorialization 
immediately following the Second World War, the story of the Quebec City riots took 
much longer to be publicly recognized. For the first fifty years following the riots there 
was little public remembrance of the event. However, in the last thirty years, increasingly 
there has been more commemoration culminating with the unveiling of the monument in 
1998. Like the texts and films produced in this period, public commemoration has largely 
reflected Provencher's work telling the story of the riots through the lens of victimization. 
By the late 1960s, perhaps as a result of the written works produced on the riots 
by some of Quebec's amateur historians, two Francophone newspapers paid a small 
tribute, for the first time, to the riots' 50th anniversary. This recognition had taken five 
decades. On the 1st anniversary (1919)345, the press had commemorated the Battle of 
Ypres, and on the 25th (1943)346 had remembered the creation of the Royal Air Force; 
however, in neither year did the newspapers choose to write about the riots. 
During the inter-war period, there appears to be no evidence that Quebecers publicly commemorated 
conscription and the riots. In March-April 1919, one year after the riots, the popular press (I looked at the 
period from the end of March to early April in Action Catholique, Le Devoir, L 'Evenement, La Presse, and 
Le Soleil) was more interested in stories about the Paris Peace Conference, Wilfred Lauder's recent death, 
the French gift of Vimy Ridge to Canada, the Spanish flu, and the return of the 22nd battalion to Quebec 
than remembering the violence in Quebec City. In their newspapers, Quebecers not only read about 
returning soldiers, but were also encouraged to participate in commemorative military events. To celebrate 
the four year anniversary of the battle of Ypres, La Presse informed its readers that there would be a 
ceremony and that all of the city's militia groups were to participate. L 'Evenement asked Quebec City 
residents to show their support for the returning 22nd battalion by organizing and attending a celebratory 
parade. Even Le Devoir celebrated the return of the troops and ignored the anniversary of the riots. 
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 In 1943, there was little evidence in the popular press that Quebecers were commemorating the riots' 
25th anniversary. Instead, the newspapers told stories about the Second World War, the first tramway strike 
in forty years, and the Boston-Detroit Stanley Cup series. There was only one French language newspaper 
that mentioned the Quebec City riots. Le Soleil, in a daily section titled "II y a vingt-cinq ans", 
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By the mid 1970s, a few years after Provencher published his two works, the 
Societe nationale des Quebecois led a movement to commemorate the riots. However, 
the result was modest. On July 1st, 1978, when most of the country was celebrating 
Canada Day, a group of Quebecers attended the unveiling of a small plaque in Quebec 
City's Lower Town. The plaque, which was placed by the city on the Confederation des 
syndicats nationaux (CSN) building , read: 
Pres d'ici tomberent sous les balles des troupes federates du Canada, 
le leravril 1918, 
Honore Bergeron (49 ans) 
Alexandre Bussieres (25 ans) 
Georges Demeule (15 ans) 
Edouard Tremblay (23 ans), 
Les Quebecois n'oublient pas 
Societe nationale des Quebecois 
lerJuilletl978.349 
But sixty years after the riots not all Quebecers agreed that they were worth 
remembering. In her book, Sarah Farmer writes, "Groups that organize around 
maintaining and communicating a common memory seek to gather others to their 
view of the events being recalled and thereby to influence public understanding of the 
past. Yet these commemorative efforts are often punctuated as much by conflict as 
consensus." Indeed, there were some who opposed the plaque's unveiling because they 
T C I 
associated such history with Quebec's separatist movements. Unable to halt the 
and French forces making progress on the battlefront. Le Devoir, L 'Action Catholique, La Presse, and 
L 'Evenement ignored the riot story but chose to remember a different history. On April 1st 1943, in full 
length articles, each of these newspapers commemorated the Royal Air Force's 25th anniversary. 
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plaque's erection, the protesters won a small victory when they convinced the municipal 
government to place it a few blocks away from the actual site of the shootings.352 
In the early 1990s, after having finished reading Quebec: sous la loi des mesures 
de guerre 1918, Louis Belanger, a civil servant, went for a walk to the intersection where 
the four victims had been killed. Dismayed by the absence of any form of 
commemoration, he wrote a letter to Quebec City's mayor Jean-Paul L'Allier. In it, 
Belanger explained that the riots were a significant event in the neighbourhood's history, 
and he felt that the plaque which was a few blocks away was not a sufficient 
commemoration. He argued that a monument needed to be built at the intersection 
where the killings had taken place. Jean-Yves Roy, the president of the St-Roch citizens' 
committee354, supported Belanger's idea for a monument and also wrote a letter to the 
Mayor. In a letter dated March 11th, 1992, Roy wrote: 
Monsieur le maire, l'annee 1993 sera le soixante-quinzieme anniversaire des 
tristes, importants et meconnus evenements qui survinrent a Quebec au printemps 
de 1918. Or, a notre connaissance, absolument rien ne souligne ces evenements 





 At the time, Belanger was a member of this committee. 
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 On the 75th anniversary, a year after Roy wrote his letter to the Mayor, Le Devoir was the only 
newspaper to write a commemorative article about the riots. "Les emeutiers de la Basse-Ville" by Remy 
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tragiques de notre histoire. De plus, nous croyons que la relance du quartier St-
Roch beneficierait d'ceuvres d'art publiques. Ces raisons nous amenent a vous 
demander d'entreprendre des demarches afin que soit edge un monument 
commemorant les evenements du printemps 1918.356 
Roy, like Belanger, believed the monument should be built at the intersection of 
the shootings. In his letter, he also made the point that the intention of the monument's 
erection would not be to "ressasser de vieilles rancoeurs", but to "embellir la ville et a 
faire en sorte que les Quebecois connaissent un evenement important de leur histoire." 
Although L'Allier was initially reluctant to satisfy Belanger and Roy's requests , 
eventually the Mayor approved the project. 
Soon after, Belanger formed a monument committee of about fifteen to twenty 
people. This group included the president of the Societe Saint-Jean-Baptiste, members 
from the Syndicat des fonctionnaires and the Caisse populaire, a few provincial 
government workers, an architect, a few artists, a local businessman, and Jean 
Provencher.359 Their first order of business was to raise money. Belanger, who was 
elected the president of the committee, says, "On avait toujours le meme probleme: pas 
d'argent, pas d'argent, pas capable a ramasser de l'argent."3 ° The only groups willing to 
give them money were the Societe Saint-Jean-Baptiste and the Caisse populaire. It 
was the latter organization that gave the committee $1500 to start the project. 
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 Interview with Louis Belanger. L'Allier initially believed that the plaque on the CSN building was 
adequate commemoration. 
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 Ibid. In the end several groups contributed money to finance the monument. Among the most important 
were: "le secretariat aux developpement des regions du gouvernement du Quebec et le ministere de la 
culture et des communications du Quebec, la Commission de la capitale nationale, la caisse d'economie des 
travailleuses et travailleurs de Quebec, la Societe Saint-Jean Baptiste de Quebec et la ville de Quebec." 
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The committee then held a contest to select a local artist to design the monument. 
After short-listing three, they gave each $500 to propose a design. One artist suggested a 
monument that would have four chairs covered by a burial shroud. Another wanted to 
build a large column with a sculpture of a bird sitting on the top, shot dead by an arrow. 
Some of the members on the committee thought that these first two proposals were 
simply too political. In the end, Aline Martineau's Quebec, Printemps 1918 won the 
contest. According to Belanger, Martineau's narrow rectangular stone flower with metal 
'if.') 
petals of human form was "le plus traditionnel des trois." 
As for the monument's explanatory text, the committee recommended a particular 
narrative which Belanger claims was not overly political. He explains that the committee 
"ne voulait jamais exagerer l'aspect nationaliste du monument. On a propose a la ville de 
Quebec un texte neutre.. .ou assez neutre." However, to the committee's surprise, the 
city's final version was much more charged. Belanger acknowledges, "notre texte ne 
parlait pas a propos des regiments anglais." 
Mayor L'Allier approved the following narrative for the plaque: 
Au printemps 1918, des evenements tragiques marquent l'histoire de la ville de 
Quebec. Le 28 mars de cette annee-la et durant cinq jours consecutifs, des 
citoyens et des citoyennes manifestent leur opposition a la mobilisation 
obligatoire et aux methodes prises par les autorites federates pour rabattre les 
consents. 
Le ler avril, tout se gate lorsque les autorites militaires donnent l'ordre aux 1200 
soldats anglophones amenes expressement de l'Ontario et de l'Ouest canadien de 
disperser a la baionette, les gens rassembles au centre-ville. Les cavaliers chargent 
la foule. Celle-ci, rassemblee a Tangle des rues Saint-Vallier, Saint-Joseph, et 
Bagot, reagit en lancant des pierres aux soldats. Apres avoir lu, en anglais, l'ordre 
Communique released by the "Comite 'Quebec, Printemps 1918'", (September 4 ' , 1998). Quebec-
Printemps 1918, Dossier M4.2/Qu, Archives de la Ville De Quebec (Quebec City). 
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de dispersion, les soldats mitraillent la foule tuant quatre personnes et en blessant 
soixante-dix autres. 
Quatre-vingt ans plus tard, une flew a petales humains s'eleve en ce lieu au 
sommet d'une sculpture monumentale. Elle symbolise la vie dont on retrouve la 
puissance dans le mouvement spontane d'un peuple qui se leve pour defendre ses 
convictions et qu'on decouvre si fragile aussi quand la mort arrive de facon 
violente comme ce le fut, ce printemps-la pour quatre quebecois: 
Honore Bergeron, 49 ans, menuisier 
Alexandre Buissieres, 25 ans, mecanicien 
Georges Demeule, 14 ans, cordonnier et machiniste 
Joseph-Edouard Tremblay, 20 ans, etudiant a l'Ecole technique 
Cette fleur, ainsi deposee, temoigne de respect qu'inspire aux vivants le souvenir 
de ceux qui laisserent ici leur vie.364 
Once the text was written, the task then turned to raising $25,000 to build the 
monument. The committee solicited the neighborhood and various groups. In 1994, 
they held a press conference attended by about twenty people, but no journalists. 
According to Belanger, "ils n'ont pas parle dans les journaux... .c'etait un echec total." 
Like the earlier protests against commemorating the riots, some Quebecers simply were 
not interested in supporting such a project. Belanger explains, "pour bien des gens et des 
journalistes c'etait comme tous les monuments sont devenus quelque chose de 
controverse.. .tous les monuments qui avaient une petite coloration politique." For 
him, it was the monument's political implications that explained why journalists and 
others were not willing to support its construction. "Chaque fois qu'on voulait parler de 
9a les gens disaient... c'est politique...mais voyons ce n'est pas politique!", he exclaims. 
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The press conference was held at the Tam-Tam Cafe on the Boulevard Langelier. 
For example, in the interview, Belanger mentioned the federalist protests at the unveiling of Quebec 
City's Charles de Gaulle monument in 1997. 
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For Belanger, the upcoming referendum on Quebec's sovereignty was also partly to 
blame. He says, "Tout 9a se passe avant le referendum.. .vois-tu 9a joue tout le temps ces 
affaires la. II y avait des gens qui venaient a la reunion et disaient 'est-ce que c'est un bon 
temps de faire 9a.. .le referendum s'en vient." However, Belanger and his committee 
vowed to complete their project. 
Nevertheless, it was hard to disassociate the monument from the politics of the 
day. In 1998, when Christiane Gagnon, a Quebec City Bloc Quebecois Member of 
Parliament, rose in the House of Commons the monument's political implications were 
apparent. She said: 
Mr. Speaker, on April 1, 1918, four people were killed by English Canadian 
soldiers at a rally against conscription. After reviewing the events, the coroner's 
inquest concluded that "the individuals shot on this occasion were innocent 
victims in no way involved in this riot—and it is the government's duty to pay fair 
and reasonable compensation to the victims' families", which has yet to be done. 
As a reminder, a work of art commemorating these tragic events will soon be 
erected at the very location where they took place in Quebec City's Lower town 
by the Comite Quebec-Printemps 1918, a group of people in the Quebec City 
area. The Bloc Quebecois asks that the federal government publicly apologize to 
the victims' families and redress an 80-year old injustice by compensating them. 
Those who appreciate historical accuracy also remember the events that occurred 
in the spring of 1918.369 
A few months later, on the morning of the unveiling, the committee feared that 
politics might ruin the ceremony. Having heard that there might be protesters in the 
crowd, Belanger decided to err on the side of caution. He explains, "j'avais un jeune fils 
que je n'ai pas amene a 1'inauguration parce que j'avais peur qu'il y aurait des 
368
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manifestations."370 However, the committee had little to fear. Out of about hundred 
people who attended the ceremony, there were only two, both in their sixties and carrying 
Canadian flags, who quietly protested the unveiling.371 Belanger describes the two as 
"des pieces d'extremistes."372 He admits that he cannot understand why anyone would 
protest the neighborhood's history which for him was "peu contestable." When the 
ceremony was over, Television Quatre-Saison interviewed Belanger, Martineau, and the 
two protesters.373 That evening, much to the chagrin of Belanger, the network allocated as 
much time to the protesters as it did to Belanger and Martineau in its report on the 
building of another controversial monument in Quebec City.374 
Today Belanger is proud of the monument he helped build to remember the 
history of his community. He says, "On pense que toute histoire a Quebec s'est passe en 
haut (in the Upper Town). C'est pas vrai."375 He believes that his working-class 
neighborhood never had much interest in remembering the story of the riots. According 
to him, "quand on parle de l'oubli et la honte, 9a je pense que c'est un element de classe." 




 In Robert Comeau's article "L'Opposition a la conscription au Quebec" (1998), the historian argues that 
there were several protesters, mainly veterans, who were at the unveiling of the monument. He writes, "lors 
du devoilement de la statue, un groupe de contre-manifestants forme surtout de veterans a manifeste sa 
disapprobation. L'exemple montre a quel point, sous le vernis de la memoire unitaire, les dissidences 
demeurent." Robert Comeau, 'L'Opposition a la conscription au Quebec,' in La Premiere Guerre Mondiale 
et le Canada, eds. Legault & Lamarre (Montreal: Meridien, 1999), 93. Unfortunately, Comeau's claims are 
not accompagnied by footnotes. This is particularly frustrating as Belanger, who had never heard of 
Comeau's article, was adamant that there were only two protesters and not a "group." Belanger was not 
sure whether or not the two protesters were veterans. 
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is a source of pride for Quebecers. He explains, "je n'ai pas l'impression qu'il y avait un 
manque.. .mais maintenant ils sont fiers d'avoir ce monument." 376 
In 2008, ten years after the unveiling, the monument was once again the site of 
gathering and protest. On the riots' 90th anniversary, the left-wing anarchist group 
NEFAC (Northeastern Federation of Anarchist-Communists/La federation des 
communists libertaires du Nord-Est) organized a rally in Quebec City's Lower Town.377 
The rally had a triple function: to evoke the riots, to protest the Canadian government's 
involvement in the Afghanistan war, and to provide a counter-commemoration to the 
official remembrance of Quebec's 400th anniversary. In a Radio-Canada interview, 
Mathieu Houle-Courcelles, a member of the anarchist group La Nuit, explained that the 
official celebrations, which largely focused on Samuel Champlain's 1608 founding of 
Quebec, ignored Quebec City's long history of conflict. He explained, "ils preferent les 
(riots) oubliees, preferent les taires...l'histoire de la ville de Quebec est ponctue de 




 "Appel a une manifestation anti-militariste." NEFAC 
http://nefac.net/fr/node/2338 (accessed May 14, 2008) 
The following is an excerpt from this website: "Quebec fut a l'epoque temoin d'une veritable revolte 
populaire contre la conscription. Du 28 mars au ler avril 1918, des foules de plusieurs milliers de 
personnes ont affronte l'armee a main nue dans les rues du centre-ville. Cinq jours d'emeutes pendant 
lesquels un poste de police est assiege, des journaux militaristes attaques et un bureau de l'armee incendie. 
Cinq jours qui se sont termines par un bain de sang dans le quartier Saint-Sauveur quand l'armee charge la 
foule, faisant 35 blesses et 4 morts. Aujourd'hui, 90 ans plus tard, le Canada est une fois de plus en guerre. 
Les motifs ne sont guere differents, il s'agit une fois de plus d'une guerre imperialiste menee au nom de la 
democratic et de la liberte. Mais, hier comme aujourd'hui, les peuples ne sont pas dupes. II n'y a peut-etre 
pas de conscription mais c'est en notre nom, et avec notre argent, que le Canada fait la guerre. Neanmoins, 
malgre la propagande incessante, une majorite de la population quebecoise s'oppose a la guerre. 
Cette opposition populaire doit pouvoir s'exprimer! C'est pourquoi nous marcherons le 28 mars prochain 
pour commemorer le 90e anniversaire des emeutes contre la conscription et pour manifester notre 
opposition a la guerre en Afghanistan." 
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wing groups in the province gathered at the nearby Bibliotheque Gabrielle Roy. 
Among them was Houle-Courcelles. In his address to the crowd, he exclaimed, "Quebec 
n'est pas qu'une ville de garnison, elle a aussi un fier passe antimilitariste."380After a few 
speeches, the group marched to the monument with signs that read "1918-2008. "90 ans 
de massacre" and "Je me souviens." One person held a sign which listed the names and 
T O 1 
ages of the four riot victims and in large bold letters read "Mort pour la liberte." 
One year later, on the 91st anniversary, Quebecers gathered once more at 
" Quebec-Printemps 1918" for another act of commemoration. Officials from the 
municipal and provincial government, from the Societe Saint-Jean Baptiste, as well as 
Aline Martineau, the monument's artist, all attended the ceremony. Four red roses were 
deposited by the monument to honour the victims of the killings. Reporting on the 
anniversary, a local Quebec City newspaper described the violence that occurred on the 
Easter Monday. "Apres avoir repousse la foule dans le quartier Saint-Sauveur et lu en 
anglais l'ordre de dispersion, le major George G. Mitchell fait installer une mitrailleuse au 
coin des rues Saint-Vallier, Saint-Joseph et Bagot et ordonne de tirer. Quatre personnes 
tombent sous les feux des soldats et aucune de celles-ci n'avait pris part a l'emeute."382 
Although the coroner's inquest recommended that the federal government should pay 
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reparations to the victims' families, the article explains that ninety-one years later the 
families are still waiting for this injustice to be resolved. 
There is perhaps no better word than "sensational" to describe how the story of 
the riots has been told since the work of Jean Provencher. In historical writing, film, and 
through public commemoration, its history has been conveyed using sensation as a key 
tool to engage the audience's attention and to frame the story from a perspective of 
victimization. In order to effectively accomplish this task, most representations, whether 
through texts, film, or commemoration, have demonized General Lessard and the 
Anglophone soldiers, while exaggerating the role that the machine guns played. Since 
Provencher, the story has changed very little because historians have resorted to parroting 
each other, rather than examining available documents in the archives. Today, due to the 
remarkable interpretative homogeneity of its various representations, Quebecers who care 
to remember the story of the riots will most likely view the event as another tragic 
example of their being victimized by the "Other." 
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Conclusion 
In the 1920s, Maurice Halbwachs, the French sociologist, wrote, "a collective 
memory, at least a significant collective memory, is understood to express some eternal 
or essential truth about the group-usually tragic." For many Quebecers, the memory of 
their collective past, at least from the Conquest onwards, is one of tragedy and 
victimization by the "Other." This memory, of course, is as much a reflection of how 
Quebecers view themselves in the present as what happened in the past. As memory is 
sometimes contested, the present often becomes a battleground for, as Halbwachs put it, 
"competing narratives about central symbols in the collective past."385 Such was the case 
in the recent public debate over Quebec's new high school history curriculum "Histoire et 
education a la citoyennete." For many, the document's perceived attempt to downplay 
some of the more divisive episodes in Quebec's history was seen as a direct attack on the 
common identity of Quebecers. The sovereignist, Eric Tremblay, wrote, "l'exercice 
revisionniste consiste a obliterer des pans entiers et les moments cruciaux de notre 
histoire ayant forge notre identite quebecoise et favorise 1'emergence du mouvement de 
liberation nationale afin d'endoctriner les jeunes etudiants."386 Likewise, in a letter 
written to the education minister, several francophone academics wrote, "Nous sommes 
enfin opposes a l'entreprise d'occultation systematique de la nation quebecoise qu'on 
observe dans le document." In the letter's last sentence, the authors write, "Le peuple 
quebecois n'est pas un acteur secondaire. C'est le personnage central de notre histoire 
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nationale!"387 In Le Devoir, Denise Bombardier wrote, "faut-il que les descendants des 
colons francais ignorent les combats de leurs ai'eux, la sueur et le sang qu'ils ont depenses 
pour se sortir de la misere?" In the end, many Quebecers were not ready to see the 
teaching of a more conciliatory and inclusive history at the expense of de-emphasizing 
such events as the Conquest, the 1837 Rebellions, or Conscription. 
It is the conscription crisis that remains the dominant memory of the First World 
War for many Quebecers. On the back cover of the 2009 winter edition of the academic 
journal Bulletin d'histoirepolitique the editors write, "la memoire quebecoise tend a ne 
'2QQ 
retenir de cet evenement (the First World War) que l'opposition a la conscription." In 
the same publication, Le Bulletin claims that the works produced on the subject of 
military history by Quebec's francophone historians continue to be far behind their 
Anglophone counterparts in Quebec and the rest of Canada.389 Historian Mourad 
Djebabla writes, "L'histoire militaire demeure encore trop souvent l'enfant pauvre des 
departements d'histoire des universites quebecoises."390 Similarly, academic Robert 
Comeau, a few years earlier said, "On a completement abandonne 9a, notamment parce 
que plusieurs historiens croient que faire de l'histoire militaire, 9a serait faire la 
promotion de l'unite canadienne."391 
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Beyond academia, most French language school textbooks written in Quebec over 
the last 40 years have focused primarily on the conscription crisis in telling their story of 
the First World War. The apparent lack of attention given to military history in the 
education system, particularly concerning the First and Second World Wars, is perhaps 
one reason why few Quebecers were interested in seeing the recent film Passchendaele 
(2008). The First World War battlefield film, which grossed $2 million in its opening ten 
days in theaters across Canada, only made $101 000 in Quebec during the same period. 
On the other hand, Le Deserteur (which opened in Quebec on the same weekend), a film 
that tells the story of a French Canadian Second World War conscript who deserts the 
Canadian army, grossed $100 000 after its opening weekend.392 In "Les deux solitudes de 
l'histoire militaire vues par le cinema", Djebabla argues that Le Deserteur's popularity is 
a direct result of Quebecers remembering the conscription crise and their resistance to the 
federal government as the defining moment of the two World Wars. 
Nevertheless, the Quebec City riots, perhaps the best example of that resistance, 
had been largely ignored by Quebec's professional and amateur historical communities 
until the Quiet Revolution. As the social and intellectual forces changed in the 1960s, 
some of the amateurs, the most important being Jean Provencher, re-discovered the story 
of the riots. Provencher's Quebec: sous la loi des mesures de guerre 1918 and his 
subsequent play Quebec, Printemps 1918 were written to honour the four victims who 
were deemed unfairly killed, as well as to commemorate those Quebecers who chose to 
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fight for, what the author believed, was a worthy cause. Additionally, in writing his book 
and play, Provencher also meant to correct the perceived historical wrong of a tragic 
event that seemed to have been forgotten by Quebecers. Although he claimed his works 
were "objective", Provencher wrote this history with a political message and accordingly 
selected, interpreted, and manipulated documents in order to strengthen his argument. 
Since then, Quebec's francophone historians, mostly amateurs, have parroted 
Provencher's works contributing very little that is new on the topic. Consequently, 
although the story of the riots is widely represented today in Quebec, it continues to be 
told through a tragic and simplistic narrative of victimization. 
Over the last forty years, Provencher's account of the riots has greatly influenced 
how the event has been portrayed in the historiography but also in other media such as 
film and in acts of public commemoration. For example, in Histoire 1534-2000 (2000), 
the most recent edition of Histoire 1534-1968 (1968), Lacoursiere, Vaugeois and 
Provencher write "Les Quebecois se souviennent grace a Jean Provencher des cinq morts 
des emeutes de 1918 a Quebec."394 A year after this textbook was published, 
Provencher's play was performed once again at Quebec City's Palais Montcalm. 
According to Louis Belanger, "C'etait gratuit.. .il y avait au moins deux cents 
personnes."395 The riots were also the focus of Beatrice Quebec 1918 (2007), a novel 
written by Gaston Theberge. Written in the tradition of Provencher, the author 
dramatically portrays Quebecers as being victimized by the "Other". Reflecting on the 
Easter Monday shootings, the narrator comments: 
Jacques Lacoursiere et al., Canada-Quebec: synthese historique, 1534-2000 (Sillery: Septentrion, 2000), 
397. 
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Je ne savais pas que l'homme pouvait faire fi de la vie ainsi, qu'il ne pouvait pas 
aimer la vie, qu'il pouvait detester la vie. J'ignorais que l'homme put tirer dans le 
brouillard sur une foule, tirer aveuglement, ne voyant pas quelle tete etait atteinte. 
Je ne soupconnais pas toute la brutalite qui faisait partie de l'homme , toute la 
rage, toute l'animalite, toute l'indignite qui etaient en lui. La fillette insouciante 
que j'etait fut propulsee dans le monde des adultes avec la force d'une balle de 
fusil, dans le monde sans innocence et sans pitie des adultes. La candeur qui 
m'appartenait, ces elans d'ingenuite qui etaient miens, cette joie qui naissait dans 
mon interieur, qui exultait en mon ame d'enfant, qui je croyais faire partie de ma 
personnalite pour toujours, se sont effaces. Je n'a jamais recouvre ce naturel qui 
s'est echappe de moi. Aujourd'hui encore il peut m'arriver de me reveiller la nuit 
parce que les soldats tirent leurs balles dans le brouillard de mes reves, apres huit 
decennies. 
Similar to Theberge's novel, the story of the riots found on the Internet, often on 
Quebec sovereignist websites, is also frequently written in a manner that depicts 
Quebecers as victims of the vilified "Other".397 For example, one website proclaims, 
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http://www.vigile.net/spip.php?page=archives&u=/archives/hist/conscription/lesageplebiscite.html 
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"emeutes 1918: un exemple, bien clair, ou la Nation Quebecoise, le peuple du Quebec et 
le Pays du Quebec doit se soumettre aux ordres du gouvernement federal contre sa propre 
volonte clairement exprimee." Referring to the Easter Monday shootings, another site 
titled "Vive le Quebec Libre" explains, "L'Etat, une fois de plus, tentait de mater par la 
force la resistance du peuple conquis a ses politiques imperialistes."399 Moreover, the 
history of the conflict offered on the Wikipedia website, which is presumably more 
visited than most sites, demonizes Lessard and his soldiers and describes Major Mitchell 
as having killed the four victims after firing the machine gun at the crowd. Not 
surprisingly, the website only referenced one historian- Jean Provencher.4 
There is much scholarly work to be done if future historians wish to go beyond 
the Provencher tradition. In order to better understand the conflict, they will need to look 
at the role which women, Quebec City Anglophones, and class tensions, among other 
elements, played during this important moment in Canadian history. Furthermore, 
historians will need to do a better job of placing the riots in the context of the larger 
conscription crisis which inspired isolated protests across the country, and which created 
divisions between not only Francophones and Anglophones but also between soldiers and 
civilians, farmers and urbanites, as well as Liberals and Conservatives. 
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However a more nuanced story of the riots, one that would be closer to the "truth" 
and presumably less divisive and less political, might not be so well received as the 
Provencher version. Although a proponent of a complex investigation of the past, one 
which embraces multiple perspectives, historian Jocelyn Letourneau recognizes that a 
simple and powerful narrative is often best received by a general public. In reaction to the 
call by some Quebecers for a more complete and sophisticated examination of the past in 
the new Quebec history curriculum, Letourneau remarked to Le Devoir, "L'historien que 
je suis est certes en droit de souhaiter une narration plus consistante et plus complexe! 
Rien a craindre pourtant de voir le recit disparaitre: cette histoire (the narrative of 
victimization) est trop puissante dans sa simplicite."401 Although Letourneau, in making 
these comments, was not referring specifically to Jean Provencher's story of the Quebec 
City riots, he might very well have been. 
1
 Le Devoir, 1 May 2006. 
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